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STATE REGULATION OF CONTRACTS WITH PUBLIC
UTILITY AFFILIATES
BY GEORGE W. SIMPKINS
The public utility holding company has been the scapegoat
upon whose head the public has been all too ready to lay all the
sins, real and imaginary, of the public utility situation. It has
been charged that the growth of public utility holding companies
has rendered state control of public utility rates a mere farce
and has cost unwary "investors" the savings of a lifetime. It
cannot be denied that there have been great abuses of the hold-
ing company device. It has in the past, and may still be, possi-
ble to sell so-called "securities" of holding companies which de-
spite their form (whether bonds, notes, or preferred stock) were
mere chips in a gamble far riskier than any played at Monte
Carlo. Rates have been based upon operating expenses which
have been inflated by the inclusion therein of large fees for ser-
vices which were not rendered and excessive prices for goods sold
to the local operating company. But there is another side to the
picture. It has certainly been true in the past that a well man-
aged holding company could supply funds to its local operating
companies at a lower interest rate than these same local com-
panies could have obtained such funds upon their individual
credit. Management should be more efficient and service better.
Surely none would desire to return to the jumble of small com-
panies which existed before the American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company secured control of a nation-wide system. Cen-
tralized purchasing and even centralized manufacturing (e. g.
the Western Electric Company for the Bell System) should and
has resulted in large savings. It may be urged that the same
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results could be obtained by unified nation-wide operating com-
panies. This may, or may not, be true in theory, but historically
local companies grew up first and it was all too often impractical
to merge them because of the rights of minority stock and se-
curity holders, laws against foreign corporations owning real
estate, restrictions in under-lying mortgages (particularly when
they contained an after-acquired property clause), discrimina-
tory tax legislation and restrictions upon the transferability of
franchises.
The problem of controlling the public utility holding company,
is essentially a dual one, involving the protection of two distinct
classes of interests. The consuming public is primarily inter-
ested in getting service at the lowest possible rates. Except so
far as service may be affected by financial catastrophes, the con-
suming public is not concerned with the safety of the financial
structure of the operating utility or of the super-imposed hold-
ing company or group of holding companies. On the other hand,
there are investors who have acquired the securities of either
the operating or the holding company. They are concerned with
the financial safety of their company rather than the service it
can give. They wish the rates to be as high as possible. This
paper is concerned with the ways by which the consumers can
be protected from exploitation by unscrupulous operators of
holding companies. It does not attempt to deal, except inciden-
tally and by way of explanation, with the means which are neces-
sary to protect prospective investors in the securities of holding
companies.
It is necessary, however, to consider briefly certain basic prin-
ciples concerning the financial structure of holding companies.
A failure to understand these concepts has led to much ill-con-
sidered, but very vehement, criticism of the holding company for
making allegedly excessive profits or for causing investors to
suffer large and unexpected losses. Under the ordinary financial
set-up in the public utility industry, the operating company will
have outstanding an issue of closed first mortgage bonds, an is-
sue of preferred stock and an issue of common stock. The hold-
ing company will probably own all the common stock. In turn
most holding companies have outstanding either collateral mort-
gage bonds (based upon the deposit of the common stocks of the
operating companies), debentures, or notes. There may, or may
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not, be an issue of preferred stock. There is always an issue of
common stock of some variety and perhaps more than one. The
principle of financial leverage or of "trading upon a thin equity"
is at once the hope and the terror of the managers of a holding
company. The operation of this principle can best be understood
by the study of a concrete case. Let us suppose that there is an
operating company whose plant cost, and is now w o r t h,
$1,000,000. It has outstanding an issue of $500,000 first mort-
gage 5% gold bonds, but has no other debt, funded or unfunded.
It likewise has issued 3,000 shares of 6%o preferred stock and
2,000 shares of common stock. Both of these stocks have a par
value of $100 per share which was actually paid in in cash. The
company is not particularly efficiently managed, but is able to
make a net profit of $60,000 per year. $43,000 is required to
pay the interest on the bonds and the dividends on the preferred
stock. This leaves available for the common stock the sum of
$17,000 or $8.50 per share. A holding company now considers
purchasing all the common stock. Its officers are confident that
they can cause the local company to be managed more efficiently
and will be able to make a net profit of $70,000 a year. This is
the sum which the state public utility commission has stated is a
fair return upon the value of the property of the local utility (a
higher rate of return has been approved in many instances, but
these figures are deliberately made overly conservative). If this
return should be made, there would be available the sum of
$27,000 to pay dividends on the common stock which will now be
held by the holding company. On the strength of these calcula-
tions, the officers of the holding company are willing to pay the
sum of $125 per share for the common stock of the local utility.
This sum is in excess of the par value of the stock but is less
than 10 times the prospective annual earnings which are $13.50
per share. It is to be noted in all this that the holding company
only plans to obtain what the state commission has already de-
cided is a fair return upon the property actually used by the
local utility. To finance this acquisition the holding company
sells an issue of $125,000 7% notes secured by a pledge of the
stock to be acquired. Even the present earnings are slightly
less than twice the required interest upon these notes, while if
the holding company's predictions are correct the interest will
be earned more than three times. The rest of the needed money
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is secured by issuing $125,000 par value of common stock, which
is paid for in cash. This stock also appears attractive. Even at
the current rate of profit for the subsidiary, there will be avail-
able profits of $6.60 per share of the common stock of the hold-
ing company. If the predictions of the holding company's offi-
cers are correct, the earnings will jump to $14.60 per share,
which would enable the holding company to pay a very liberal
divident upon the money invested. Yet, in all this the holding
company is not attempting to obtain anything more than a fair
return upon the value of the underlying property. Unfortu-
nately, an economic depression ensues. Despite operating econo-
mies, the underlying company's revenues decrease by $10,000.
There is now available only $50,000 with which to pay the inter-
est on the underlying bonda and preferred stock. These two
items require $43,000. The remaining $7,000 is not sufficient to
pay the interest on the holding company's notes. This default
will force a receivership or bankruptcy of the holding company,
wiping out the equity of the common stockholders of that com-
pany, for which they paid $125,000 in cash. It will also result in
severe losses to the purchasers of the notes. Thus do the manag-
ers of the destiny of the holding company discover what an all-
destroying Frankenstein they have created.
It would not have been worth while to devote so much atten-
tion to these elemental principles of holding company finance if
their action did not so vitally affect the regulation of charges be-
tween the affiliated members of the holding company structure.
The terrific pressure of fixed charges of the more speculatively
capitalized holding companies is thought by the commissions to
exert a sinister influence upon the managers of these bodies, so
as to cause them to divert money which properly belongs to the
subsidiaries into the treasury of the holding company. As long
as this is openly done, it is primarily the security holders of the
operating company who are injured. But it may be done in-
directly. The operating expenses of the subsidiary may be in-
flated by excessive payments to some other subsidiary and a rate
increase demanded because of these operating expenses. The
purpose of this paper is to consider how such tactics may be pre-
vented.
Superficially, it would seem that the easiest and surest means
by which a state commission could avoid all the difficulties of
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holding company regulation would be by merely disregarding the
corporate entities involved and treating the local company to be
regulated as a mere part of the larger unity. Many commissions
have seized upon this method. Unfortunately neither the courts
nor the commissions have laid down any clear tests by which
it may be ascertained whether the conditions are such that the
corporate entities may be disregarded. It is therefore essential
to examine each class of cases in which this has been done, ascer-
tain the reasoning upon which such action is based, and deter-
mine the probable legality of such procedure.
The simplest situation is where the sole fact that the holding
company owns all the stock (presumably except director's quali-
fying shares) is seized upon as a reason for disregarding the
corporate entities. Such a view has been the favorite of many
commissions which have based their decisions invoking it upon
the principle that so long as the holding company gets the money
it does not matter how it receives it.' Such reasoning begs the
question by assuming the point at issue, i. e., that the holding
company is not entitled to make any profit on the contractual
relations it may have with the operating company. In rate cases
it has been adopted by the Supreme Courts of Ohio and Montana.
2
In the following footnotes an attempt has been made to cite all decisions
by the commissions or courts (so far as these have been published in the
standards sets of reports) in which there is any substantial discussion of
the questions involved. Decisions cited from the Public Utilities Reports
are decisions by the commission in the state shown in the parenthesis.
' United Paper Board Co. v. D. & H. Co. (1930) 168 I. C. C. 297; Traffic
Bureau v. N. S. R. R. Co. (1926) 109 I. C. C. 52; United Paper Board Co. v.
C. R. R. of N. J. (1925) 95 I. C. C. 608; Traffic Bureau v. A. C. L. R. R. Co.
(1925) 107 I. C. C. 156; Arizona Packing Co. v. A. E. R. R. Co. (1923)
81 I. C. C. 115; Re Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. (La. P. S. C. 1922) P. U. R.
1922 E, 86; Public Service Commission v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. C.
(Md. 1924) P. U. R. 1925 B, 545; Re Michigan State Tel. Co. (Mich. 1921)
P. U. R. 1921 C, 545; Re Michigan State Tel. Co. (Mich. 1922) P. U. R.
1923 A, 30; Fowler v. Billings Gas Co. (Mont. 1931) P. U. R. 1932 A, 456;
Re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. (N. C. 1921) 1921 D, 447; contra: Re
Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co. (1924) 93 I. C. C. 13. Commissions have
occasionally applied the reverse of this principle so as to refuse to disregard
corporate entities when the holding company did not own all the stock of
the local company although it did own a legally controlling stock interest.
Galveston Commercial Ass'n v. G., H. & S. A. Ry. Co. (1927) 128 I. C. C.
349; Re Carthage Gas Co. (1922) 12 Mo. P. S. C. 637.
, Ohio Mining Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (1922) 106 Oh. St. 138,
140 N. E. 143; Gallatin Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission
(1927) 79 Mont. 269, 256 Pac. 373. A similar position was assumed to
uphold a transaction as not being contrary to the New York Anti-Trust
Statutes in Continental Securities Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co.
(C. C. A. 2, 1915) 221 F. 44.
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The Montana case primarily relies upon the earlier Ohio deci-
sion. The opinion of the Ohio court is far from satisfactory. It
announces the doctrine but only after the court has admitted that
the commission could reach the same result on another ground.
It cites in support of its conclusion a group of cases in none of
which was stock ownership considered the decisive or apparently
even a very important factor. Aside from mere quotations, from
some of these cases, of general statements which were not made
with reference to fact situations in which mere stock ownership
was the only factor to support disregard of the corporate fiction
the present opinion makes no attempt to advance any reasons
for its view. Alabama has a statute which specifically allows the
public utilities coimnission to disregard corporate entities if it
so desires in all cases in which the parent owns all the common
stock of the subsidiary.3 In the absence of such a statute the
great weight of authority is that the corporate entities must be
respected if this is the only reason which can be advanced for
their being cast aside. Such a view has been upheld by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in a series of cases involving
the Associated companies of the Bell system in which the Ameri-
can Telephone and Telegraph Company held all the common
stock, which alone had the right to vote. In the first of these
cases, City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,4 the
point does not seem to have been seriously contested by the
counsel for the city of Houston. However, in the famous cases
of Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public
Service Commissions (involving rates in the City of St. Louis)
and Smith v. Illinois Telephone Co.,6 (involving rates in the City
of Chicago) the point was fully and ably discussed by counsel on
both sides. Although the tendency of the courts to treat all
cases involving the possible disregard of the corporate entity as
sui generis weakens the force of precedents which do not involve
the question of rate regulation, it is interesting to observe that
the Supreme Court has steadily refused to disregard the corpor-
3 R. S. Ala. (1923) sec. 9792. It was applied in Public Service Commis-
sion v. Souther Natural Gas Co. (Ala. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 C, 31; Home-
wood v. Birmingham Electric Co. (Ala. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 D, 463.(1921) 259 U. S. 518.
(1923) 262 U. S. 276.
0 (1930) 282 U. S. 133.
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ate entity when the only ground was complete stock ownership.-
It would seem that the view of the United States Supreme Court
is the more consistent with the accepted principles of legal the-
ory, although perhaps not with those of popular belief. The
subsidiary will almost always have creditors who are interested
in the continued existence as a distinct unit of the property on
which they rely. More fundamentally important is the legal
principle which denies to stockholders the right to remove direct-
ors during their term of office except for good cause shown." If
the parent is thus to be deprived of legally effective control over
the child, it is hardly just to say that they form one unity.
However, if the holding company uses its stock ownership and
the factual power that this gives over the directors, there is apt
to be created a situation under which the courts will sanction
the disregarding of the corporate entity. If the situation be-
comes such that the parent company absolutely dominates the
action of the local company, this result will follow. Unfortu-
nately the cases have not laid down a concrete and readily applic-
able test by which to determine with objective precision whether
this required domination exists. The cases representing the ma-
jority rule when dealing with complete stock ownership concede
that the holding company may use the voting power of its stock
to elect directors which will represent its interests. It is possible
to set forth certain factors which will probably lead the courts
'Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. M. P. R. R. Co. (1885) 115 U. S. 587
(liability on a contract); Humphreys v. McKissock (1891) 140 U. S. 304
(liability on a mortgage); Peterson v. C., R. I. & P. R. R. Co. (1907) 205
U. S. 362 (service of process) ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Stick-
ney (1909) 215 U. S. 98 (reasonableness of combination rates as determined
by value of the service); U. S. v. D. & H. Co. (1909) 213 U. S. 366 (Com-
modities Clause of the Interstate Commerce Commission Act); Philadelphia
& Reading Co. v. McKibbin (1917) 243 U. S. 264 (service of process);
Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1924) 267 U. S. 330 (same).
In accord: Bronx Gas & Electric Co. v. Prendergast (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1924)
1 F. (2d) 323 (where the attempt was to force the companies to operate as
a unit to produce savings expected by the New York Public Service Com-
mission). The cases on the whole subject of the disregard of the corporate
entity have been collected in Anderson, Disregard of the Corporate Entity,
and Powell, Parent and Subsidiary Coroporations. These only treat public
utilities incidentally. The various law review articles which attempt to
treat public utilities specifically are practically worthless. They are either
a mere statement of two or three of the outstanding cases coupled with the
propagandistic opinions of the author or if they attempt to deduce legal
principles their conclusions are vitiated because of the failure to refer to
important cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.
'Cook on Corporations (8th ed.) sec. 624.
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to decide that this domination exists. The most important and
most easily recognized is the failure to provide the subsidiary
with a board of directors which contains any but the tools or
officers of the parent company.9 This was apparently the de-
cisive factor in the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in
the leading case of People ex rel. Potter v. Michigan Bell Tele-
phone Company.2° This test was approved by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Reading Company.1  The
opinion in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company clearly
shows that the court considered this test as still valid, although
it did not apply there because only three of the nine directors
were connected with the holding company or were officers of the
subsidiary and hence likely to obey implicitly the wishes of the
holding company so as to retain their jobs. The cavalier manner
in which the Federal district court treated the action of the
Michigan commission which had followed the decision in the
Potter case cannot be too bitterly condemned.1 2 These judges
ruled on the basis of a mere citation of the Houston, and South-
western Bell cases that this disregard of the corporate entity
could not be applied in a Federal court. The decision shows an
utter failure to understand the principle upon which the Potter
case was based, since neither of the allegedly controlling deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court was based upon fact
situations in which there was this failure to provide independent
directors. The only points of similarity between the cases were
that both companies were subsidiaries of the American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company and both companies had manage-
ment contracts with the parent organization.
'C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic Ass'n (1918) 247 U. S. 409;
People ex rel. Woodhaven Gaslight Co. v. Public Service Commission (1923)
203 App. Div. 369, 196 N. Y. S. 623, aff'd (1924) 236 N. Y. 530, 142 N. E.
271 (Memo); aff'd (1925) 266 U. S. 244 (discussion on another point).
Cf. also cases cited in notes 10 and 11. A study of the directorates of the
Associated Companies. of the Bell system shows that the American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co. has ordinarily been careful to avoid trouble on
this score. The same care has not been exercised by such holding companies
as Cities Service Co. and Associated Gas and Electric Co. (The directors
are given for each company in Moody's Manual of Public Utilities). If the
subsidiary is to be used as a means of borrowing money it would seem ad-
vantageous to place local bankers and financiers upon its board.
(1929) 246 Mich. -198, 224 N. W. 438.
(1920) 253 U. S. 26.
"Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Odell (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1930) 45
E (2) 180.
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The other factor which is very weighty in pursuading the
courts to disregard the corporate entities is that the parent com-
pany attempts to give orders directly to the officers of the sub-
sidiary or to dictate who shall be such officials. 13 Under such
circumstances it, would seem only fair to disregard the corporate
entity which is not to be respected by the very persons who are
now demanding that it be recognized. Where there are manage-
ment contracts between the subsidiary and the parent holding
company or some other subsidiary of the parent company, it is
very easy to maintain that there is this improper direction.-4 To
guard against such results, the more carefully drawn manage-
ment contracts now provide that the holding company or its af-
filiate shall only furnish advice which may, or may not, be ac-
cepted by the officers of the subsidiary. Even in such cases, it
would seem very easy to show that there was this improper giv-
ing of direct orders unless the persons concerned were very care-
ful to observe the correct formalities. The only way that the
holding company can guard against this danger is to confine its
U. S. v. D. & H. Co. (1909) 213 U. S. 366; U. S. v. Lehigh Valley
R. R. C. (1911) 220 U. S. 257; U. S. v. D., L. & W. Co. (1915) 238 U. S.
516 (all three cases involving the Commodities Clause). The principle as
applied in the following rate cases: Richmond Chamber of Commerce v.
S. A. L. Ry. Co. (1917) 44 I. C. 455; Re Blackshear Mfg. Co. (1924) 87
I. C. C. 654; Re Livestock Rates in the Southwest (1924) 91 I. C. C. 292;
Re Transit Privileges and Intermediate Rule on Lumber (1925) 95 I. C. C.
154; Re Livestock to and from Points in the Southeast (1925) 101 I. C. C.
105; Bragg & Millsaps Co. v. A. & W. P. R. R. Co. (1927) 128 I. C. C. 238;
Re Routing on Cotton (1927) 129 I. C. C. 387; Re Routing from Points on
S. C. D. & P. Ry. Co. (1928) 142 I. C. C. 230; A. T. & N. R. R. Co. v.
So. Ry. Co. (1928) 148 I. C. C. 708; Hohenberg & Co. v. A. & W. R. R. Co.
(1929) 151 I. C. C. 574; Longhart Supply Co. v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co.
(1929) 153 I. C. C. 118; Big Lake Box Co. v. S. P. Co. (1929) 155 I. C. C.
240; Humbard Construction Co. v. So. Ry. Co. (1930) 161 I. C. C. 38; Russ
Market Co. v. N. W. P. R. R. Co. (1930) 171 I. C. C. 117; Re Alabama
Power Co. (Fed. Power Comm. 1932) P. U. R. 1932 D, 345; Re Citizens
Tel. Co. (Ind. 1924) P. U. R. 1924 E, 835; Re Cities Service Gas Co.
(Mo. 1931) P. U. R. 1931 E, 11; City of Fulton v. Panhandle Eastern
Pipe-Line Co. (Mo. 1932) P. U. R. 1933 A, 256; Casanave v. Overbrook
Steamheat Co. (Pa. 1925) P. U. R. 1926 A, 600; Re Tennessee Electric
Power Co. (Tenn. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 E, 312; Re Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co. (Va. 1926) P. U. R. 1926 E, 481.
" Re Houghton County Traction Co. (Mich. 1919) P. U. R. 1919 D, 350;
Re Houghton County Traction Co. (Mich. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 D, 350 Cf.
Federal Trade Commission v. Smith (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 185
(where the purpose of disregarding the corporate entity was to show that
the Electric Bond and Share Co. was engaged in interstate commerce and
hence subject to the inquisitorial jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Com-
mission).
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advice to matters of general policy which are subsequently acted
upon by the board of directors of the subsidiary.
Closely allied to this type of situation are those in which the
holding company has made no apparent effort in good faith to
put the local company on a profitable basis. Under such circum-
stances, the subsidiary cannot use its failure to make a fair rate
of return as a reason for abandoning service. 5 The only cases
in which such policies have been adopted have been cases in
which holding companies primarily engaged into the sale of
electricity have found themselves under the necessity of taking
over local street railway lines because of the corporate connec-
tion between, them and an electrical utility which they desire
to control. The long continued decline in the credit and earning
capacity of such traction properties has made it desirable that
they get out of this business as rapidly as possible even at a
loss, for investors have a prejudice against securities where the
prospectus reveals that they are based, even in part, upon earn-
ings derived from such sources. 6 Unfortunately, from the hold-
ing company's point of view, traction companies are public utili-
ties and cannot simply abandon service. However, if it can be
shown that there is no prospect of making a fair return on a fair
value abandonment will be sanctioned,17 and the holding com-
pany can salvage what it can by liquidating the tractioll
company. Under the pressure of such impelling economic and
financial motives, certain holding companies adopted these prac-
tices. A case involving such practices Was carried to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, which granted mandamus to
compel the continuation of service. It is true that the opinion
on the first hearing of State ex rel. Daniel v. Broad River Power
Co.' 8 did not rely upon this abuse, but rather upon the fact that
the holding company had not respected the corporate entity of
its subsidiary because it had intervened directly in the manage-
ment of the traction company. On a rehearing, the element of
abuse was strongly stressed. This proved fortunate, since the
IRe Hudson Valley Ry. Co. (N. Y. 1927) P. U. R. 1927 C, 326; Re
Columbia Ry., G. & E. Co. (S. C. 1927) P. U. R. 1927) D, 684.
" Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations p. 1227.
" Railroad Commission v. Eastern Texas R. R. Co. (1924) 264 U. S. 79;
Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland (1925) 267 U. S. 330.(1930) 281 U. S. 537, rehearing (1930) 282 U. S. 187, followed Coney
v. Broad River Power Co. (1933) 172 S. E. 437.
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point was considered by all the justices and was the sole ground
for upholding the former decision in the opinion of Justices Van
Deventer, Butler, Sutherland, and McReynolds, who changed
their minds as to what was shown by the evidence as to the exist-
ence of the alleged direct intervention."9
Similar considerations have led to the disregarding of the
corporate entity when the subsidiary was created solely to evade
the statutes regulating public utilities.20 Clearly, the same con-
siderations apply here as caused the corporate entities to be dis-
regarded in the historic Northern Securities Company case.21
Under such circumstances it does not matter whether the hold-
ing company owns all the stock of the subsidiary or not. 2
The weakest of all cases for the disregarding of the corporate
entities involved are those in which there is merely a showing
that one company manages another without any showing as to
the ownership of the stock of the company under such manage-
ment. There is no case involving action by a state commission
which has proceeded on this basis. 3 The Interstate Commerce
Commission has acted upon such evidence in a variety of cases.24
" Both points were stressed in the briefs of counsel in this case.
" Pearsall v. G. N. Ry. Co. (1896) 161 U. S. 646; Re West Missouri
Power Co. (Mo. 1928) P. U. R. 1929 A, 61. The same result has been
reached where the only reason for the division of the companies was a de-
sire to escape from the shackles of a mortgage covering after acquired
property. Re Independence Water Co. (1919) 7 Mo. P. S. C. 582; Re
B. & Q. Service Co. Inc. (N. Y. 1930) P. U. R. 1931 A, 392 (dicta in
approviig the arrangement).
" Northern Securities Co. v. U. S. (1904) 193 U. S. 197; U. S. v. U. P.
R. R. Co. (1912) 226 U. S. 61 (where there was never any intent to acquire
more than voting control of the competing railroad).
2" Less than complete stock ownership was involved in the cases of Pear-
sail v. G. N. Ry. Co.; Northern Securities Co. v. U. S.; and U. S. V. U. P.
R. R. Co. cited in notes 20 and 21.
' The nearest precedent is the action of the Texas Commission in the
case of Re Fort Worth Gas Co. (1928) P. U. R. 1929 A, 136 in which the
commission considered it unnecessary to make any finding as to the extent
of affiliation. Actually all the stock of both companies was owned by the
same holding company. In the more recent case of Re Northwestern Elec-
tric Co. (Ore. 1932) P. U. R. 1933 B, 41 all the stock of the local company
was owned by the American Power & Light Co., nineteen percent of whose
stock was owned by the Electric Bond & Share Co. which had a manage-
ment contract with the local company. The commission felt justified in
disregarding the corporate entities involved, but there was also a very
considerable interlocking of the directorates of the three companies.
" Commercial Club v. G. N. Ry. Co. (1912) 24 I. C. C. 96; Shrevesport
Chamber of Commerce v. K. C. S. Ry. Co. (1916) 39 I. C. C. 296; North
Vernon Lumber Co. v. I. C. R. R. Co. (1921) 61 I. C. C. 355; U. S. War
Dept. v. A. & S. Ry. Co. (1923) 83 I. C. C. 742; Re Brick and Draintile
from St. Louis (1923) 85 I. C. C. 353; Nebraska Livestock Case (1924)
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As far as the Interstate Commerce Commission is concerned
there is considerable excuse for such holdings, since Congress
has expressly directed that this course be followed in fixing the
location of joint routes. 25 It occasionally happens that a firm of
engineers will be hired to supply expert managerial service for a
group of independently owned utilities. Under such circum-
stances it would seem highly unjust to disregard the corporate
entities involved since beneficial ownership might be in wholely
distinct persons. Such a situation still exists with reference to
the properties belonging to Eastern Utilities Associates which
is under the management supervision of Stone & Webster Inc.,
although its managers do not hold any interest in the stock of
the Associates. 26 The Electric Bond and Share Company has
consistently followed the practice of only acquiring a minority of
the stock of its principal subsidiary holding companies. 2
Although the theory of disregarding the corporate entity has
many attractive features so far as simplicity and directness of
regulation are concerned, it also possesses many great disad-
vantages. The most obvious, but least serious, of these is the
fact that such a ruling would normally result in forcing the
commission to undertake to value all the property of the parent
company which is used and useful in supplying the service to the
particular locality whose rates are under investigation. This
might force a commission in California to attempt to value office
buildings in New York or a commission in Illinois gas fields in
Texas. This danger is more chimerical than real since it can be
avoided under the recent ruling of the Supreme Court of the
United States that the municipality concerned may be made the
unit and calculated values substituted for a precise determina-
89 I. C. C. 444; Restrictions of Routing (1930) 165 I. C. C. 3; Acme Brick
Co. v. A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1930) 168 I. C. C. 583; Egyptian Tile &
Timber Co. v. M. I. R. R. Co. (1931) 176 I. C. C. 354.
36 Stat. 552 (1910), 49 U. S. C. 15 (4).
Moody's Manual of Public Utilities 1932. In their annual report for
1932 to their stockholders Stone & Webster Inc. announces that they have
made such contracts with several other independent companies during the
year and that the majority of their service as supervisory engineers is to
wholely independent companies. 136 Commercial and Financial Chronicle
(March 11, 1933) p. 1708.
Recently they have departed from that policy in that they hold 52 per
cent of the voting stock of the American and Foreign Power Co. At the
time securities of this company were originally sold to the public it was
stated that Electric Bond and Share Co. planned to retain only a minority
interest. (Prospectus issued for sale of $7.00 preferred stock.)
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tion of the values of assets lying outside its boundaries.28  In
certain instances it may prove highly disadvantageous to the
consumers to disregard the corporate entity. This will be true
in cases in which the contract between the two companies is
based upon the price which certain property cost while the prop-
erty would have a higher present value because of the general
increase in the price level, causing it to have a higher "fair
value" on account of the weight given the factor of reproduction
costs.29 In communities whose population is expanding similar
results might occur because of the tendency of land prices to
rise.
State commissions are jealous of their jurisdiction and loathe
to surrender it to national authorities. Yet, the doctrine of dis-
regarding the corporate entity may lead to just this result. In
the case of Peunsylvania, Gas Company v. Public Service Com-
mission3 1 it was held that a company which brought natural gas
into a state and distributed it to local consumers was engaged
in interstate commerce while so doing, although the state could
regulate the rates charged for local distribution of gas where
Congress has not acted. But if Congress should act, its regula-
tions would prevail.31 The complete control that the Interstate
Commerce Commissions possesses over intrastate rates charged
by railroads engaged in interstate commerce 32 would indicate
that if it once were held that the combined company was engaged
in interstate commerce, the Interstate Commerce Commission
could be given complete control over its intrastate rates. With
the growing use of natural gas (often mixed with manufactured
Wabash Valley Electric Company v. Young (1933) 53 S. Ct. 234.
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis (concurred in by Mr.
Justice Holmes) in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public
Service Commission, supra, shows how widely these figures may differ even
if general prices remain stationary. If the general price level has changed,
the difference will be very great. Under the present theory involving the
use of cost, in certain cases, as a measure of reasonableness, no price can
be reasonable if it is above competitive prices( no matter what the costs
may be). Re Southern Power Co. (N. C. 1924) P. U. R. 1924 B, 821.
- (1920) 252 U. S. 23; Public Utility Com. v. Landon (1919) 249 U. S.
236; Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co. (1923) 265 U. S. 298.
'" This was admitted in Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion. It has been recognized law as to interstate commerce ever since the
decision in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia (1851)
12 How. 299.
"Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. (1922) 257
U. S. 563.
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gas) and the spreading network of high tension electric lines, it
is inevitable that most of the great holding companies will be
partially engaged in interstate commerce. This situation has al-
ready arisen in the telephone industry.
THE EARLY PERIOD
If we decide to discard the theory of the disregard of the cor-
porate entity, as being either inapplicable under the fact situa-
tion or undesirable as a question of general policy, we are not
reduced to the mere impotent acquiescence and acceptance of
whatever charges the holding company may see fit to make and
include in the operating expenses of the local company. The
commissions and the courts still have great power to scrutinize
and reduce such charges if they be excessive. Unfortunately,
the commissions have not always realized that they possessed
such powers and the courts have been misled into making state-
ments in language well calculated to cause even greater confu-
sion among the commissions. In treating this question it is vi-
tally necessary to use a historical approach. The commissions
are naturely prone to look to the Supreme Court of the United
States as a final arbiter to determine how far they can go with-
out violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Thus, the cases naturally fall into four great classes
whose divisions are marked by the opinions in City of Houston v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company,33 Missouri ex rel. South-
western Bell Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission,4
and Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company2Y Such an exami-
nation is not a mere vain display of historical erudition. It is
impossible to understand the difficulties of interpreting and ra-
tionalizing the most recent decisions without a background of
the earlier decisions which have never been overruled or clearly
repudiated. Moreover, it is the custom bf commissions to deter-
mine cases largely on the basis of the earlier cases involving the
same company, rather than remembering what they have decided
a week before in a case involving an exactly similar situation but
different parties.
The opinions of the courts during the early period paid little
- (1921) 259 U. S. 518.
(1923) 262 U. S. 276.(1930) 282 U. S. 133.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss1/1
REGULATION OF UTILITY CONTRACTS
attention to the question of what charges might be allowed as
operating expenses and what power the commissions had over
the amount of these charges. The reason for this situation was
the fact that the earlier rate regulations were by legislative fiat
without previous investigation and mostly concerned railroads
wherein the operating expenses covered such a multitude of dif-
ferent items that the really important question was the issue
of how much of these costs should be assigned to the commodity
whose rate is being fixed rather than what should be included
in the total of costs. Another factor, which is still operative, is
that in many utilities the operating expenses are relatively a
small proportion of the total revenue collected. Most of the in-
come is required to pay for the large capital investment. This
is particularly true of water-works, natural gas pipelines, and
hydro-electric power developments. Under such circumstances
the great conflict will be over the value of these assets since this
is the factor which will affect most directly the rates which will
have to be paid by the consumer.
However, court decisions are not entirely lacking. In the case
of Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. WellmanP3 the United
States Supreme Court dismissed a case in which it was sought
to have a Michigan rate statute held unconstitutional on the basis
of a stipulation setting forth what the Railway Company had
actually paid out as expenses during the past years. Mr. Justice
Brewer, speaking for a unanimous court, used these significant
words:
A single suggestion in this direction: It is agreed that the
defendant's operating expenses for the year 1888 were
$2,404,516.54. Of what do these operating expenses consist?
Are they made up partially of extravagant salaries-fifty to
one hundred thousand dollars to the president and in like
proportion to the subordinate officers? Surely, before the
courts are called upon to adjudge an, act of the legislature
fixing the maximum passenger rates for railroads to be un-
constitutional on the ground that its enforcement would
prevent the stockholders from receiving any dividends on
their investments, or the bondholders any interest on their
loans, they should be fully advised as to what is done with
the receipts and earnings of the company; for, if so advised,
it might clearly appear that a prudent and honest manage-
- (1892) 143 U. S. 339.
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ment would, within the rates prescibed, secure to the bond-
holders their interest and to the stockholders reasonable
dividends. While the protection of vested rights of property
is a supreme duty of the courts, it has not come to this:
that the legislative power rests subservient to the discre-
tion of any railroad corporation which may, by exorbitant
and unreasonable salaries, or in some other improper way,
transfer its earnings into what it is pleased to call "oper-
ating expenses."
This language is very forceful. Under it the good faith or
lack of it of the railroad officials is apparently immaterial. What
are proper operating expenses are not subject to their "discre-
tion". The test is an objective one: what are reasonable ex-
penses which would be incurred in operation by an honest and
prudent management. If the courts and commissions had only
remembered these wise words, there would never have been seri-
ous trouble in controlling holding companies and their affiliates.
Six years later (1898) the leading case of Smyth v. Ames 3 an-
nounced what has ever since been considered the test of "fair
value." Under it "operating expenses" were one of the factors
to be considered in determining the final figure. The case of
Darnell v. Edwards38 again denied that the owner of property
had discretion as to what he might consider as operating ex-
penses. In 1921 the Supreme Court of the United States was
called to pass upon the sum charged by the Galveston Electric
Company for maintainence. A unanimous court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Brandeis, ruled that it was correct to use
the "amount normally required for that purpose during the pe-
riod" rather than the "amount actually expended within the
year."39 Perhaps the situation has been most pithily stated by
a lower federal court, "Efficiency of plant is a prerequisite to
reasonable rates. ' 40 The Transportation Act of 1920 directs the
Interstate Commerce Commission to fix rates so that each group
of carriers shall be able to earn a fair return "under honest, effi-
cient, and economical management and reasonable expenditures
(1898) 169 U. S. 468.
(1917) 244 U. S. 564.
' Galveston Electric Co. v. City of Galveston (1921) 258 U. S. 388.
° Landon v. Court of Industrial Relations (D. C. D. Kan. 1920) 269
F. 433.
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for maintainence." 41 Even without this legislative direction, this
basis was being followed by the Commission.42
The state commission generally followed similar views.
Charges were frequently disallowed because the commission felt
that the utility could have secured the same service or com-
modity from others at lower prices.4 3  In other instances the
charges were eliminated on the ground that they were unneces-
sary for so small a utility.- Although the Missouri Public Ser-
vice Commission had frequently acted on such views, there is
one case in which it considered that it was bound by the contract
price even though it appears "excessive". 45 Probably this may
be considered as a mere oversight by an over-worked commis-
sion. Moreover, the increase granted in this case was only tem-
porary and the commission recommended that the utility attempt
to obtain a more favorable contract. In certain cases, the com-
missions have gone to great lengths under this power to fix rea-
"41 Stat. 488 (1920), 49 U. S. C. 15a. In prescribing just division in
cases in which the Commission has established through routes and joint
rates, the Commission is directed to consider the "efficiency" with which
the carriers concerned are operated. 41 Stat. 486 (1920), 49 U. S. C. 15
(6).
" Re Advance in Rates-Eastern Case (1911) 20 I. C. C. 243; Re Ad-
vance in Rates-Western Case (1911) 20 I. C. C. 307; Re Express Rates
(1912) 24 I. C. C. 380; L. & N. R. R. Co. Coal and Coke Rates (1913) 26
I. C. C. 20; Re Express Rates (1913) 28 I. C. C. 131; Re Western Passenger
Fares (1915) 37 I. C. C. 1; New Orleans Terminal Allowances (1917) 42
I. C. C. 748.
" In Re Etna Development Co. (Cal. 1915) P. U. R. 1916 A, 134; In Re
Farmers Co-Operative Union (Cal. 1915) P. U. R. 1916 A, 271; In Re
William B. Ross (Ill. 1915) P. U. R. 1915 D, 646; Re Indiana Fuel & Light
Co. (Ind. 1921) P. U. R. 1921 E, 381; In Re Marshfield Electric Co. (1918)
7 Mo. P. S. C. 134; In Re LaFayette Tel. Co. (1919) 8 Mo. P. S. C. 346;
In Re Hanamo Tel. Co. (1920) 9 Mo. P. S. C. 521; Re Pawnee Tel. Co.
(Neb. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 D, 501; Re Public Service Gas Co. (N. J. 1919)
P. U. R. 1920 A, 233; Re Nashville Ry. & Light Co. (Tenn. C. 1920) P. U.
R. 1920 C, 1; Charlesworth v. Omro Electric Light Co. (Wis. 1915) P. U. R.
1915 B, 1.
Re Arizona Electric-Tel. Co. (Ariz. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 E, 695; Re
Matin Water Co. (Cal. 1916) P. U. R. 1916 F, 782; Re Madera Canal &
Irrigation Co. (Cal. 1917) P. U. R. 1917 F, 642; City of Pekin v. Pekin
Waterworks Co. (Ill. 1917) P. U. R. 1917 C, 838; Re Central Indiana Tel.
Co. (Ind. 1918) P. U. R. 1918 E, 859; In Re Hume Tel. Co. (1914) 1 Mo.
P. S. C. 405; In Re City Power Co. of Sedalia (1916) 4 Mo. P. S. C. 140;
In Re Bunceton Ice, Light, & Fuel Co. (1918) 6 Mo. P. S. C. 408; In Re
Missouri Public Utlities Co. (1918) 7 Mo. P. S. C. 569; In Re Clarence
Tel. Co. (1920) 9 Mo. P. S. C. 498; Re Wessell Tel. Exchange (1921) 11
Mo. P. S. C. 182; Re Clifton Forge Mutual Tel. Co. (Va. 1920) P. U. R.
1920 C, 252; Re Charlestown Water Co. (W. Va. 1916) P. U. R. 1916
D, 725.
"In Re Edgerton Electric Light & Power Co. (1918) 6 Mo. P. S. C. 259.
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sonable operating expenses. They have drawn up detailed lists
of the types of employees required by the company and the
salary which should be paid to each.46 In one case this entailed
a most peculiar result. Two brothers were the sole stockholders
of a Missouri utility and were paying themselves salaries at
the rate of $50 per month for all the work that needed to be
done. The Commission decided that the company was efficiently
managed and would require the services of two persons who
should be paid $100 a month apiece. This happened although
the brothers had made no claim that they were paying them-
selves too low salariesY.4
Holding these views, it is not surprizing that the commissions
have applied the same test of reasonableness in passing upon
cases in which persons holding large or controlling blocks of the
stock of the utility are also receiving salaries from the utility.
In some of these cases, the question is easily settled. The com-
mission finds that the stockholder was doing absolutely nothing
in return for his salary.48 In such case the salary is merely a
form of dividend. More frequently, the officer does something
in return for his pay. In such instances, the commission will
only allow the amount for which some one else could be hired
to perform the same duties.49 As far as the operating utility is
'In Re Clarence Tel. Co. (1920) 9 Mo. P. S. C. 498; Re Charlestown
Water Co. (W. Va. 1916) P. U. R. 1916 D, 725.
"Re Moore Brothers Electric Light & Power Co. (1918) 7 Mo. P. S. C.
210. Re Central Indiana Tel. Co. (Ind. 1918) P. U. R. 1918 E, 859 is some-
what similar in that the commission undertook to provide funds for an
increase in salaries and wages to all employees although the company had
announced that it had no present intention of making such an increase.
"Re Leadville Water Co. (Col. 1921) P. U. R. 1921 D, 172; Re W. B.
Hagar (Idaho 1918) P. U. R. 1918 E, 451; Re United Public Service Com-
pany (Ind. 1918) P. U. R. 1918 F, 316; Re Indianapolis Water Co. (Ind.
1918) P. U. R. 1919 A, 448; In Re Capital City Water Co. (1918) 5 Mo.
P. S. C. 619; Re Salem Light & Power Co. (1920) 10 Mo. P. S. C. 26; Re
Western Electric Co. (N. D. 1921) P. U. R. 1921 E, 569.
" In Re Westside Gas Co. (Cal. 1915) P. U. R. 1916 A, 276; Re San
Francisco, Napa & Calistoga Ry. Co. (Cal. 1917) P. U. R. 1917 E, 546;
Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Water & Light Co. (Idaho 1915) P. U. R. 1915
F, 445; Re Cairo Water Co. (Ill. 1920) P. U. R. 1921 A, 764; Re Sterling
Water Co. (Ill. 1920) P. U. R. 1921 A, 801; Fort Wayne v. Home Tel. &
Tel. Co. (Ind. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 D, 83; Simms v. Columbia Tel. Co.
(1915) 2 Mo. P. S. C. 256; City of Columbia v. Watts Engineering Co.
(1918) 7 Mo. P. S. C. 78; Re LaFayette Tel. Co. (Mo. 1919) P. U. R.
1920 A, 169; In Re Seneca Tel. Co. (1920) 9 Mo. P. S. C. 563; Springfield
City Water Co. v. Springfield (1920) 10 Mo. P. S. C. 42; Re Poughkeepsie
& Wappingern Falls R. R. Co. (N. Y. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 C, 995; Rose v.
Mercersberg, Lehmasters & Marks Electric Co. (Pa. 1919) P. U. R. 1919 F,
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concerned, these officers and stockholders occupy exactly the
same position as a holding company, since the influence of both
is due to the voting right of the stock they hold. Unfortunately,
this analogy was rarely realized by the commissions, who were
blinded by the complexities of the corporate financial structure
of the holding companies.
We are now prepared to examine how the courts and commis-
sions treated contracts between subsidiary public utilities and
their parent holding companies or other companies controlled by
the same holding company. The great holding company of this
period was the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
and the commissions of virtually every state were called upon
to determine how the contracts of this system were to be treated.
These contracts were of two classes. By one the American Com-
pany guaranteed to furnish the subsidiary all the instruments
for installation with the customer that were required (and a
reserve stock equal to 3% of those in use) ; managerial advice
upon any and all problems, whether concerned with public rela-
tions, engineering, research, construction, accounting, or the law;
licenses under all patents issued or to be issued to the American
Company or its subsidiaries; protection against all claims for
infringement of patents; representation in all suits before public
utilities commissions, or federal commissions or taxing bodies;
and finally financial assistance by loans to any extent that might
be required by the subsidiary. All this was in return for 41/2%
of the gross income of the subsidiary.50 Distinct from this con-
tract but only enjoyable by companies which had agreed to this
contract was a special contract with the Western Electric Com-
pany (practically wholely owned by the American Company).
Under this contract the local companies were privileged to buy
what supplies they desired at special prices below those charged
to outsiders. There was no contractual compulsion to buy if
more advantageous prices could be obtained elsewhere. Most of
714; Fox v. Pine Grove Electric Light, Heat & Power Co. (Pa. 1919) P. U.
R. 1920 B, 380; Re West Virginia Central Gas Co. (W. Va. 1918) P. U. R.
1918 C, 453; State Journal Printing Co. v. Madison Gas & Electric Co.
(1910) 4 Wis. R. R. C. R. 501, 1. c. 640.
0 This was the percentage in force at this time. On January 1, 1926, it
was reduced to 4%. On January 1, 1928 the American Company sold the
telephones to the Associated Companies, ceased to furnish any instruments,
and reduced the charge to 2% of the gross. On January 1, 1929 this was
still further reduced to 1 %.
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the commissions at this period were not seriously concerned over
the contracts which fixed the division of toll revenues between
the American Company, which owned the long lines between
cities, and the subsidiaries which furnished the local connections.
It must not be imagined, however, that there were not other
holding companies whose contracts were investigated. But even
these contracts primarily concerned managerial services. The
situation in which the subsidiary was merely the local distributor
of gas or electricity bought from an affiliated company did not
develop until later when it was produced by the spread of net-
work of natural gas pipe-lines and superpower transmission
lines.
Court decisions with reference to holding companies did not
come until late in the period and did not then attempt to treat
the subject systematically; therefore consideration of them is
best postponed until after the commission decisions have been
studied. Since the commissions asserted the doctrine that they
could disallow ordinary operating expenses unless they were rea-
sonable, it is but natural that the vast majority treated these
holding company contracts on the same basis.
It is necessary to examine the various tests by which the com-
missions undertook to determine if a given contract basis was
reasonable. Some commissions have allowed management fees
on the mere showing that the service was of greater "value" to
the local company than its cost in fees.51 This test is highly
unsatisfactory in its application since the term "value" is so un-
certain. In a few decisions which apply this principle the situa-
tion is made even worse by the fact that "value to the people"
served by the utility is also considered.5 2 In such decisions we
find the payment of the 42% contract charge to the American
" City of Birmingham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. (Ala. 1918) P. U.
R. 1919 B, 791; Re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. (Ark. 1920) P. U. R. 1921
B, 516; Re Rates and Charges of Tel. Companies (Ariz. 1919) P. U. R.
1920 B, 411; Re Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. (Col. 1917) P. U. R. 1917
B, 198; Re Mountain States Tel. Co. (Idaho 1921) P. U. R. 1921 B, 739;
Re Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. (La. 1921) P. U. R. 1921 C, 363; Re Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tel. Co. (Md. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 F, 417; In Re Missouri
Public Utlities Co. (Mo. 1915) P. U. R. 1915 C, 1017; Commercial Club v.
Missouri Public Utilities Co. (1915) 2 Mo. P. S. C. 311; Re Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. (Va. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 F, 49.
' Re Rates and Charges of Telephone Companies (Ariz. 1919) P. U. R.
1920 B, 411; Re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. (Md. 1916) P. U. R. 1916
C, 925.
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Telephone and Telegraph Company upheld on the basis that the
service in the United States is better than that in France.5 3
This is true, but the same reasoning would uphold any charge
no matter how outrageous. In one of the rare cases in which
the Missouri Public Service Company adopted the "value" cri-
terion, it so limited it as to create a workable test. The services
could have no "value" to the utility unless they saved it more
than they cost.5 The trouble with the whole attempt to use
value as a criterion to determine what sum should actually be
allowed is that the services may have value to the utility higher
than their cost and still be obtainable elsewhere at a lower price.
Far better are those cases which seek to determine reason-
ableness by reference to the sum that it would cost the utility
to perform the service for itself.5 Certainly, the allowed con-
tract price should not be more than this sum. Unfortunately
this also is not an accurate test of how much should actually be
allowed, since the service may be of such a nature that it can
only be done effectively by large organizations serving many in-
dividual utilities. This is particularly true of expert engineering
advice for which there will only be occasional need when broad
questions of policy must be decided.
" This basis was used in both cases cited in note 50.
" Commercial Club v. Missouri Public Utilities Co. (1915) 2 Mo. P. S. C.
311. When the value test is used negatively, it gives a just result, i. e. the
local utility should not be forced to pay for services which have no value to
it. In Re Application of the Southern Sierras Power Co. (Cal. 1915) P. U.
R. 1915 B, 27; In Re Central California Gas Co. (Cal. 1915) P. U. R. 1915
D, 607; Sherman v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co. (Cal. 1918)
P. U. R. 1918 D, 93; Re Missouri & Kansas Tel. Co. (Kan. 1918) P. U. R.
1918 C, 55; City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Electric Co. (Ill. 1916)
P. U. R. 1916 C, 281; Re Spring Valley Utilities Co. (Ill. 1920) P. U. R. 1920
F, 139; Arlington Petition (Mass. 1915) P. U. R. 1916 B, 363; Re Lansing
Fuel & Gas Co. (Mich. 1921) P. U. R. 1921 C, 465; Re Helena Light & Ry.
Co. (Mont. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 D, 668; Buck v. New York Tel. Co. (N. Y.
1921) P. U. R. 1921 E, 798; Re Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co.
(Wis. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 D, 428; The Missouri cases which reached this
same result are treated below at page ??.
"Re Belvedere Water Co. (Cal. 1916) P. U. R. 1917 D, 210; City of
Lincoln v. Lincoln Water Co. (Ill. 1916) P. U. R. 1917 B, 1; City of Blue-
field v. Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. (W. Va. 1917) P. U. R.
1917 E, 22; Re West Virginia Central Gas Co. (W. Va. 1918) P. U. R.
1918 C, 453; Bogart v. Wisconsin Tel. Co. (Wis. 1916) P. U. R. 1916 C,
1020; Birmingham v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. (Ala. 1918) P. U. R.
1919 B, 791; Re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. (Ark. 1920) P. U. R. 1921 B,
516; In Re Telephone Rates, Rules, and Practices in the city of Milwaukee
(1916) 17 Wis. R. R. C. R. 524; Croty v. Tomah Electric & Tel. Co. (Wis.
1916) P. U. R. 1917 A, 439.
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These considerations caused many commissions to supplement
the last test by inquiring whether the utility could obtain the
same service elsewhere at a lower price.56 Such a view was sanc-
tioned by the Supreme Court of Illinois in State Public Utility
Commission ex rel. City of Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Elec-
tric Co. 5 7  It was also relied upon by the federal court for the
southern district of Texas which held the initial hearing in the
Houston case. 8 It was applied by Judge Learned Hand with ref-
erence to contracts between the Consolidated Gas Company of
New York and the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey made
when a director of the latter was a member of the executive
committee of the former company.5, In this case the judge's
opinion shows that he was fully conscious of the difficulty of
applying such a test in cases in which there is virtually no com-
petitive market. Three commissions adopted for a time a slight
variant of this test by which the total sum paid for manage-
ment was considered; and, if this was found to be no more than
that paid by other utilities of similar size, this lump sum was
allowed.60 So long as only small utilities are considered such a
test would work well, but it would prove extremely uncertain if
the number of other units of comparable size was limited, for
'Re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. (Ga. 1921) P. U. R. 1921 C, 833; Re
City of Peoria and Receivers of the Central Union Tel. Co. (Ill. 1918)
P. U. R. 1918 E 74; Re Michigan State Tel. Co. (Mich. 1918) P. U. R. 1918
C, 81; In Re Kirskville Light, Power & Ice Co. (Mo. 1915) P. U. R. 1915
C, 114; In Re Kansas City Light & Power Co. (1919) 8 Mo. P. S. C. 223;
Stone v. New York Tel. Co. (N. Y. 1921) P. U. R. 1921 D, 736; Moore v.
Valley Railways Co. (Pa. 1919) P. U. R. 1919 F, 493; Re Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co. (S. C. 1921) P. U. R. 1921 D, 530; Re Rainier & Elgin,
Receivers of the Memphis Gas & Electric Co. (Tenn. 1921) P. U. R. 1921
C, 121; Re Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. (Utah 1921) P. U. R. 1921 E,
117; Re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. (W. Va. 1920) P. U. R. 1921 B, 97.
' (1920) 291 Ill. 209, 125 N. E. 891. This case has been very frequently
misconstrued because of its references to the view that the commission is
not the financial manager of the utility. It says this but upholds the action
of the Illinois commission in disallowing charges when they were higher
than the competitive price. The commission had proceeded on the view
that the services were of no value whatsoever.
t Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Houston (D. C. S. D. Tex. 1920)
268 F, 878.
" Consolidated Gas Co. of New York v. Newton (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1920)
267 F. 231, aff'd Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co. (1921) 258 U. S. 651
(the opinion of the Supreme Court does not mention this point).
'Re Colorado Springs Light, Heat & Power Co. (Col. 1916) P. U. R.
1916 C, 464; Re Concord, Maynard & Hudson St. Ry. Co. (Mass. 1917)
P. U. R. 1917 E, 59; Re Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co. (Minn. 1921) P. U. R.
1921 C, 733.
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many of these might actually be mismanaged. If the commis-
sion must first investigate the reasonableness of the figures
which are being used as a control, the task will be endless.
To meet these objections some commissions based the allowed
figure upon the cost of rendering the services.6i Such a cost is
figured upon the invested capital and a fair rate of return on
it and hence is different from the fair return upon a fair value
which would be allowed in cases in which the corporate entity
was disregarded. Economically it has considerable justification
since the operation of the laws of supply and demand in a free
market would tend to make the selling price at least approximate
the cost. With reference to managerial services there is not or-
dinarily a free and open competitive market and hence there
seems to be little injustice in basing allowed operating expenses
upon this criterion. Such a view was followed by the Supreme
Court of Nebraska in Re Lincoln Tractiou Company,62 but was
expressly disapproved by the Federal district court in the Hou-
sto-t case.63 Although we shall see that this was the view finally
adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company, it did not then en-
joy much favor with the commissions. The difficulties of cost
accounting where the service rendered involved many intangible
factors, as under the American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany 41/2% contract, would naturally tempt the commissions to
try other and simpler tests first, while the companies were main-
taining that the commissions had no power whatsoever over
these contracts.
Where the attempt was made to regulate operating expenses
as represented by contracts with affiliates upon any of the above
" In Re United Light & Power Co. (Cal. 1915) P. U. R. 1915 C, 622; Re
Potomac Electric Power Co. (D. C. 1917) P. U. R. 1917 F, 70; In Re
Washington Ry. & Electric Co. (D. C. 1915) P. U. R. 1915 F, 34; In Re
Macon Ry. & Light Co. (Ga. 1915) P. U. R. 1915 E, 648; Newton and
Watertown Petition (Mass. 1915) P. U. R. 1915 D, 787; Re Boston Consoli-
dated Gas Co. (Mass. 1919) P. U. R. 1919 E, 583; Re Omaha & Southern
Interurban Ry. Co. (Neb. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 C, 897; Re Massachusetts
Northeastern St. Ry. Co. Mass. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 D, 1053; Re Pacific Tel.
& Tel. Co. (Ore. 1919) P. U. R. 1919 D, 345; Re Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (Ore.
1921) P. U. R. 1921 D, 530; Re Bluefields Waterworks & Improvement Co.
(W. Va. 1921) P. U. R. 1921 E, 665.
" (1919) 103 Neb. 229, 171 N. W. 192.
" Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Houston (D. C. S. D. Tex. 1920) 268
F. 878.
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principles, the burden of proof was on the local company to show
that its operating expenses should be allowed.64 It is clearly
most convenient, if operating expenses are to be rigorously con-
trolled that the burden, of proof should rest upon the utility.
Under such a principle self-interest will force the holding com-
pany to reveal all necessary data, while the complainants' seek-
ing a rate reduction would have great difficulty in obtaining the
same information by the examination of hostile witnesses or the
examination of the books of the holding company which are nat-
urally more easily understood by the persons who keep them
than by outsiders.
From the point of view of the utility it would be advisable to
know in advance whether or not a contract price would be
allowed, particularly if the company was considering asking for
an increase in rates. Such motives have caused companies to
submit contracts to the commission for approval before they are
signed.65 The commissions have ordinarily approved these con-
tracts in blanket terms. Such blanket approval of contracts
which have any considerable duration would seem dangerous.
Subsequent events may change what should be allowed as oper-
ating expenses. In such a case the consumers should not be
forced to pay for the mistakes of the management in making
contracts covering too long a term. Yet, if the commission has
approved the contract in advance, the commission would be likely
to feel itself bound to allow it in all subsequent rate controveries.
Kings County Lighting Co. v. Lewis (1920 180 N. Y. S. 570; Jamaica
Gas Light Co. v. Nixon (1920) 110 Misc. 500, 181 N. Y. S. 623; Re Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tel. Co. (D. C. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 D, 614; Belleville v.
St. Clair County Gas & Electric Co. (Ill. 1915) P. U. R. 1915 F, 235;
Belleville v. St. Clair County Gas & Electric Co. (Ill. 1915) P. U. R. 1916
B, 24; Re City of Peoria and Receivers of the Central Union Tel. Co. (Ill.
1918) P. U. R. 1918 E, 74; City of Belleville v. East St. Louis & Suburban
Ry. Co. (Ill. 1919) P. U. R. 1919 E, 916; Re Freeport Gas Co. (Ill. 1920)
P. U. R. 1920 B, 726; In Re Northhampton Petition (Mass. 1915) P. U. R.
1915 A, 618; Natick Petitions (Mass. 1915) P. U. R. 1915 D, 655; City of
Columbia v. Watts Engineering Co. (Mo. 1918) P. U. R. 1918 D, 157;
Mayor of Olean v. Keystone Gas Co. (N. Y. 1919) P. U. R. 1920 A, 307;
Re Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co. (Wis. 1920) P. U. R. 1920
D, 428. Similar views are implicit in almost every case cited in notes 51 to
63, the cases cited in this note merely considering the problem more thor-
oughly.
"Express Contract 1920 (1920) 59 I. C. C. 518; Commercial Club v.
Citizens Gas & Fuel Co. (Ind. 1916) P. U. R. 1916 E, 1; In Re Kansas City
Gas Co. (1920) 9 Mo. P. S. C. 448; Dobson v. Kensington Ry. Co. (Md.
1917) P. U. R. 1917 F, 102; In Re Norfolk & Bristol St. Ry. Co. (Mass.
1915) P. U. R. 1915 E, 411.
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By a general order in 1917 the Massachusetts Board of Gas and
Electric Commissions applying to all companies which had inter-
locking directorates or officials required that all contracts should
either be let at auction to the highest bidder or be subject to
the approval of the commission. 6
In a few instances the commissions have felt themselves bound
by the terms of the contract unless they could show that the
contract was the result of an abuse of discretion by the directors
of the local company.6 7 The commission cases upon this point
are not particularly enlightening as they do not deign to supply
any reasons for the conclusions and cite no authority.68 From
a reading of these opinions one would never suspect that the
commissions have, as we have seen, power to disallow ordinary
operating expenses if they do not consider them to be reasonable.
This view was also enunciated by certain courts. The first of
these cases in point of time was Havre de Grace & Perryville
Bridge Co. v. Towers6" decided by the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals in 1918. In this case the commission had disallowed the
salary paid the President who owned the controlling stock. The
commission had based its decision on the ground that this gentle-
man actually did no work for the company. The Court consid-
ered this an interference with the constitutional right of the
company to manage itself. It stated that the decided cases hold
that the commission is not the financial manager of the utility
and cannot do this. No reason is given for this statement other
than the bare citation of the names of four cases which are
claimed to be authority for this view.70 It is true that all four
"Re Awarding of Contracts (Mass. 1917) P. U. R. 1917 B, 397.
"Re San Diego Electric Ry Co. (Cal. 1919) P. U. R. 1920 B, 86; Re
Central Illinois Light Co. (Ill. 1920) P. U. R. 1921 A, 688; City of Blue-
fields v. Bluefields Waterworks & Improvement Co. (W. Va. 1918) P. U. R.
1919 A, 790. These are all isolated cases as cases before the same com-
missions, both before and after these decisions, do not follow these views.
Cf. cases cited in notes 51 to 64.
" None of these cases even mention the commissions power over ordinary
operating expenses or undertake to say why it should make operating ex-
penses sacrosanct for them to be enshrined in a contract with an affiliate
when they would not possess this immunity if the contract was with an
independent company.
- (1918) 132 Md. 16, 103 Atl. 319.
These cases are: Laird v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. (1913) 121 Md.
179, 88 Atl. 348; People ex rel. Binghampton Light, Heat & Power Co. v.
Stevens (1911) 203 N. Y. 7, 96 N. E. 114; People ex rel. Delaware & Hudson
Co. v. Stevens (1909) 197 N. Y. 1, 90 N. E. 60; Towers v. United Ry. &
Electric Co. (1915) 126 Md. 478, 95 N. E. 170.
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cases make the statement that the commission is not the finan-
cial manager of the utility. Unfortunately, none of them even
mentions the question of operating expenses. Three of the cases
deny the power of the commission to pass upon the expediency
of issuing bonds or stock, while the fourth concerns the expedi-
ency of building an extension. A similar statement was made
by the Federal District Court for the Western District of Mis-
souri in St. Joseph Railway, Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Public
Service Commission,71 but here the statement primarily con-
cerned questions of general business policy as to the nature of
means by which gas should be manufactured rather than the
costs involved in the proper operation of either method. In one
case involving the much litigated 41/2% contract of the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company, the majority of the Michi-
gan Supreme Court said that the contract must be upheld pro-
vided the management is "fairly economical" and "the contract
was made in good faith."7 2 This is an apparent attempt to strad-
dle the issue. However, the case actually was dismissed for
failure of the City of Detroit to sustain its burden of showing
by the weight of evidence that the commission was in error in
refusing to reduce the rates being charged. Since the City had
not introduced any new evidence at all to attack the commission's
finding, it was not necessary to decide whether or not the con-
tract was valid. The most frequently cited case on this subject
is the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in State Public Util-
ities Commission ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield Gas and Elec-
tric Co.73 . This contained a passage which reads:
The commission is not the financial manager of the cor-
poration and it is not empowered to substitute its judgment
for that of the directors of the corporation; nor can it ignore
items charged by the utility as operating expenses unless
there is an abuse of discretion in that regard by the cor-
porate officers.
At first glance this would seem a sweeping repudiation of the
doctrine that the commission can disallow operating expenses if
it does not consider them reasonable. A careful examination of
' (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1920) 268 F. 267.
City of Detroit v. Michigan Railroad Commission (1920) 209 Mich. 395,
177 N. W. 306.
(1920) 291 Ill. 209, 125 N. E. 891.
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the whole opinion will show that the court must have meant
much less than it seems to say. The commission had disallowed
a large part of the management fee charged by an affiliate on the
ground that the price charged was excessive compared to the
cost of hiring executives who would be capable of actively man-
aging the corporation. This was specifically held by the Court
to have been a proper exercise of the commission's power; yet
there was not the slightest showing of abuse of discretion by
the corporate officers who made the contract. Such a conclusion
cannot be reconciled with the language used unless the language
is to be interpreted very narrowly so as to mean that the com-
mission cannot ignore, without assigning a reason founded upon
a full investigation, items charged as operating expenses. The
quoted words were used with reference to the rejection of the
commission's views that the company might save money and earn
a fair return at the allowed rates if it would radically alter its
whole method of manufacturing gas, involving the investment
of a large amount of new capital. It was admitted that the
plant was an efficient representative of its type.
There are certain expedients by which a commission may
avoid passing upon the general question of its power to disallow
contractual charges between affiliates. If the contract is for the
rental of equipment, the commission may include the value of
the equipment in the value of the projberty upon which the utility
is to be allowed to earn a fair return.74 Theoretically it would
seem that this is correct, since the case of Smytt& v. Ames said
that the attempt was to determine the fair value of the property
"used and useful" in rendering the public service. Ownership is
not apparently important. In the Valuation Act of 1913 Con-
gress directed the Insterstate Commerce Commission to include
both owned and leased property. 75 Any other holding would
"Re Missouri Kansas Tel. Co. (Kan. 1918) P. U. R. 1918 C, 55; Re
Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. (Ind. 1918) P. U. R. 1919 A, 278;
Re Central Union Tel. Co. (Ind. 1920) P. U. R. 1920 B, 813; Re Laclede
Gaslight Co. (1914) 1 Mo. P. S. C. 258; In Re Kansas City, Clay County &
St. Joseph Ry Co. (1914) 2 Mo. P. S. C. 51; City of Kansas City v. Kansas
City Tel. Co. (1921) 11 Mo. P. S. C. 731; Re Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (Ore.
1919) P. U. R. 1919 D, 345; Public Service Commission v. Grays' Harbor
Ry. & Light Co. (Wash. 1915) P. U. R. 1915 C, 518; Milwaukee Electric
Ry. & Light Co. v. Milwaukee (Wis. 1918) P. U. R. 1918 E, 1; Milwaukee
Electric Ry. & Light Co. v. Milwaukee (Wis. 1919) P. U. R. 1919 D, 504.
"37 Stat. 701 (1913), 49 U. S. C. 19a.
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allow a company to avoid all possibility of fluctuation in its value
by adopting the simple expedient of owning none of the property
it used.
If the affiliate concerned is also a utility within the state, the
commission may summon the affiliate before it and proceed to
fix the rates which it may charge on the basis that it has power
to regulate all contracts made by utilities for the sale of theit
services.7" Under such a procedure the commission can make
binding orders fixing the price for the future rather than merely
settling what will be allowed as operating expenses and leaving
the company free to pay whatever it desired provided it adjusted
its books properly. This plan will not work if the affiliate sells
the gas, water, or electric current to the company in another
state, for commissions have no power over utilities in other
states. In such instances the only remedy based on this method
would be to request the commission in the other state to act,
which it probably would do as a matter of comity.
The final method of securing relief and yet evading the neces-
sity of passing on whether the contract price should be allowed
or not is to assume that it is allowable but hold that it should not
all be allocated to operating expenses as a matter of proper ac-
counting practice.77 When dealing with the 41/2% contract of
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company such a result
is certainly correct as a matter of strict accounting. The Asso-
ciated companies are constantly expanding their plant and much
of the engineering service provided is connected with this change.
Therefore it should be allocated to the construction account
rather than to current operating expenses. With reference to
other holding companies this result would not be so easy to jus-
tify, as they mostly follow the practice of separating their
charges for current management from their charges for engi-
neering supervision during construction.
"' Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma(Okla. Supreme Court 1918) P. U. R. 1918 D, 515 (not reported elsewhere);
Re East St. Louis Light & Power Co. (Ill. 1919) P. U. R. 1919 E, 379;
Muskegon Traction & Lighting Co. v. Grand Rapids, Grand Haven, &
Muskegon Ry. Co. (Mich. 1921) P. U. R. 1921 C, 583; Intermountain Tel.
& Electric Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. (Mont. 1917) P. U. R.
1918 C, 120; Lehigh Valley Transit Co. v. New Street Bridge Co. (Pa. 1919)
P. U. R. 1919 C, 696.
'Re San Diego Consolidated Gas & Electric Co. (Cal. 1916) P. U. R.
1917 A, 930; Re Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. (Col. 1917) P. U. R. 1917
B, 198.
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It is interesting to examine with somewhat greater detail the
views of the Missouri Public Service Commission upon the treat-
ment of contracts with affiliates in so far as they were reflected
in its opinions during this period. During the first year of its
existence the case of McGregor-Noe Hardware Co. v. Springfield
Gas & Electric Co.78 came before it. In this case a percentage
of the gross income was paid to the holding company in return
for managerial services. The commission announced that it
could refuse to allow operating expenses even though they had
actually been incurred if they were "excessive or unreasonable."
As a test of reasonableness the commission investigated to deter-
mine whether the company could perform the services more
cheaply for itself. Here the fee was completely disallowed on
the ground that the managerial services were absolutely value-
less to the local company since it already had a large and capable
executive force. In a decision in the next year the commission
actually used a test based on the saving to the local company
(joint purchases, etc.) ; but stated that ordinarily the test should
be the amount for which the local company could do the work
itself or buy it in the open market.7 9 The views of the commis-
sion were most fully expressed in the case involving the tele-
phone rates charged in St. Louis by the Southwestern Telephone
and Telegraph Company, an Associated Company of the Bell
system now known as the Southwestern Bell Telephone Com-
pany. The commission refused to allow the 41/2 % contract. The
value of the instruments furnished was determined and included
in the rate base. The commission decided that the other services
supplied by the American Company were absolutely valueless in
view of the large, highly-paid, and efficient staff possessed by the
local company.,' In so far as the merits of this particular con-
tract were concerned, the commission long regarded this deci-
sion as being "not final" but rather temporary until the commis-
sion should have time to investigate the nature of the services
"(1914) 1 Mo. P. S. C. 468. No attempt is here made to cite every
Missouri decision. They are treated largely under their proper heads.
"Commercial Club v. Missouri Public Utilities Co. (1915) 2 Mo. P. S. C.
311. In a slightly earlier case where the utility bought coal from an affili-
ate, the commission allowed the charge but recommended economy. There
was no showing of the relation between the price charged and the competi-
tive price. Weaver v. Kirksville Light, Power & Ice Co. (1915) 2 Mo.
P. S. C. 225.
" In Re Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. (1915) 8 Mo. P. S. C. 43.
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more fully."' After a time the commission actually returned to
the percentage method of figuring the proper charge. Somebody
noticed that the formula used in the St. Louis case resulted in
allowing 45% of the sum charged by the American company. It
was easier to use this percentage than to value the instruments
and calculate the sums necessary for depreciation, maintainence,
and return. Hence by 192Q the commission had adopted this
practice.8 2 This is thoroughly illogical, for the amount of gross
revenue may vary considerably even though the same number
of instruments are in use. Of course, increased use would in-
crease maintainence, but it would not increase either deprecia-
tion or return. The St. Louis case was eventually carried before
the Supreme Court of Missouri which approved the action of the
commission.
8 3
Such was the state of the law in 1921 when the case of the
City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company84 was
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. The ma-
jority of commissions and courts considered the issue to be
whether or not the contract price was reasonable, although they
varied as to the means by which this issue was to be decided.
A few decisions championed the view that the commission could
not intervene unless an abuse of discretion was shown. Many
commissions found ways to dodge the decision of the general
question as to the power of the commission and still limit the
allowance of particular charges. The burden of proof was upon
the utility to justify sums claimed by it to have been expended
as operating expenses. The Missouri commission was squarely
in line with the great weight of authority and because of the
time relation of some of its decisions might well be called a pi-
oneer in this development.
THE PERIOD 1921-1923
It is now necessary to trace the development of the law during
the period between the decision of the Houston case late in 1921
and the Southwestern Bell case late in 1923. The language used
'Public Service Commission v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. (1919) 8 Mo.
P. S. C. 487.
Re Kansas City Tel. Co. (1920) 10 Mo. P. S. C. 156.
State ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission
(Mo. 1921) 233 S. W. 425, reversed (1923) 262 U. S. 276, infra page ??.
(1921) 259 U. S. 318.
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by the Supreme Court in deciding the Houston case deserves to
be quoted in full (in so far as it affects this point) :
It is contended by the City that no fair disclosure was
made by the furnishing companies of their profits on the
instruments and on the materials and supplies so furnished
and that for this unique reason the company should not be
heard in a court of equity and the case dismissed. It is true
that the Company did not introduce proof to show what the
profits of the two companies were, either upon the business
done with it or upon their entire business, but it did intro-
duce much evidence tending to show that the charges made
and allowed for the services rendered and the supplies fur-
nished by them was (sic) reasonable and less than the same
could be obtained from other sources. Under the circum-
stances disclosed in the evidence, the fact that the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company controlled the Company
and the Western Electric Company by stock ownership is
not important beyond requiring close scrutiny of their deal-
ings to prevent imposition upon the community served by
the Company, but the court recognized and applied this rule.
Here again, the evidence introduced by the City was meager
and indefinite, while that of the Company was exceptionally
full and complete, and both contentions must be denied.
This language is highly significant. It clearly recognizes the
right of the commission to disallow such contractual charges if
they are not reasonable. It considers competitive cost as a suffi-
cient test of reasonableness. Complete stock ownership is not a
ground for disregarding the corporate entities, but only for
closely scrutinizing the contracts. The case does not decide upon
whom rests the burden of proof.
As might be expected after such a case the commissions and
the courts which had long been asserting that the charges must
be reasonable to be allowed continued to do so, using competitive
cost as the proper test.8 5 A few commissions considered that
"New England Divisions (1922) 66 I. C. C. 196; N. M. C. Ry. Co. v. A.
T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1923) 81 I. C. C. 718; Re Southern California Tel. Co.(Cal. 1921) P. U. R. 1922 C, 97; Re Pacific Electric Ry. Co. (Cal. 1921)
P. U. R. 1922 C, 134; Re Great Western Power Co. (Cal. 1923) P. U. R.
1923 C, 545; City of Great Bend v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. (Kan. 1921)
P. U. R. 1921 A, 321; Re Indiana Bell Tel. Co. (Ind. 1922) P. U. R. 1922
C, 348; Re Indiana Bell Tel. Co. (Ind. 1922) P. U. R. 1922 C, 758; In Re
Carthage Gas Co. (1922) 12 Mo. P. S. C. 361; In Re Webb City & Carter-
ville Gas Co. (1922) 12 Mo. P. S. C. 361; Re Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.
(Neb. 1922) P. U. R. 1923 B, 112; Re Mountain States Tel. Co. (N. Mex.
1923) P. U. R. 1923 B, 352; Pavillion Natural Gas Co. v. Tri-County
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cost to the affiliate performing the services was the I roper test,
at least where there was not an open competitive market from
which a competitive price could be obtained. 0 In so doing they
were probably going contrary to the implications of the Howton
case, but an examination of the brief of the City of Houston in
that case shows that they argued the case on the claim of the
propriety of disregarding the corporate entity and did not con-
sider the possibilities of attaining the result they desired by
other means. Under such conditions the court may not have
realized that no other organization was in a position to offer the
services, particularly in research and engineering, which were
supplied by the American Company under this contract. More-
over, the 4 % contract and the Western Electric Company con-
tract were considered together and as to many items under the
latter contract there was clearly a competitive market. Perhaps
the most unusual reason for disallowing management contracts
was advanced by the Oregon commission. It considered that
they were conspiracies in restraint of trade and in violation of
Natural Gas Co. (N. Y. 1923) P. U. R. 1923 D, 630 City of Reading v.
Reading Transit & Light Co. (Pa. 1921) P. U. R. 1922 A, 346; Re Knox-
ville Gas Co. (Tenn. 1922) P. U. R. 1922 E, 524; Dunn v. Rutland Ry.,
Light & Power Co. (Vt. 1923) P. U. R. 1923 C, 316; Virginia ex rel. City
of Newport News v. Newport News Light & Water Co. (Va. 1923) P. U. R.
1923 D, 91;-Re Crandon Tel. Co. (Wis. 1921) P. U. R. 1922 A, 164; Toma-
hawk v. Tomahawk Light, Tel. & Improvement Co. (Wis. 1921) P. U. R.
1922 A, 259. During this period the Interstate Commerce Commission
made a series of investigations into the contracts certain roads had made
for the repair of equipment. These contracts were criticized as being
higher than competitive prices. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. (1922) 66 I. C.
C. 694; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. (1922) 66 I. C. C. 727; New York
Central Railroad Co. (1922) 66 I. C. C. 732; Seaboard Airline Co. (1922)
69 I. C. C. 151; Erie Railroad Co. (1924) 93 I. C. C. 646. In the first of
these cases Commissioner Potter dissented on the ground that the contracts
could not be attacked as no bad faith was shown.
Several courts adopted the same test. New Jersey Central Traction Co.
v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners (1921) 96 N. J. L. 90, 113 At.
692; Hardin-Wyandot Lighting Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (1923)
108 Oh. St. 207, 140 N. E. 779; State ex rel. Capital City Water Co. v.
Public Service Commission (1923) 298 Mo. 524, 252 S. W. 446; State ex rel.
Spokane v. Kuykendall (1922) 119 Wash. 107, 205 Pac. 3; cf. in accord:
City of Cleveland v. Public Utilities Commission (1921) 102 Oh. St. 341,
131 N. E. 714; Ohio Mining Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (1922) 106
Oh. St. 138, 140 N. E. 103.
"Re Tucson Gas, Electric Light & Power Co. (Ariz. 1922) P. U. R. 1922
C, 658; Re Michigan State Tel. Co. (Mich. 1922) P. U. R. 1923 A, 30; Re
New York Tel. Co. (N. Y. 1923) P. U. R. 1923 B, 545; Re Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co. (Ore. 1922) P. U. R. 1922 C, 248; Re Indiana Bell Tel. Co. (Ind. 1923)
P. U. R. 1924 A, 1.
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the Sherman and Clayton Anti-Trust Acts.7 The present writer
is unable to understand this view as he can see in these con-
tracts no intent to restrain trade whether interstate or not. At
worst they were mere attempts to secure secret profits at the
expense of higher rates to the consumer.
There is one court decision which is generally cited as uphold-
ing the view that the commission cannot disallow operating ex-
penses even though they be unreasonable. It says that the rates
must be high enough to pay "all operating expenses" citing as
authority the page of the Springfield case on which is found the
passage that the commission is not the financial manager of the
utility and cannot ignore operating expenses actually incurred
unless an abuse of discretion is shown1 8 The point does not
seem to have been seriously argued to the court and this was a
mere passing reference.
There was considerable development in the law with respect
to the question on whom rested the burden of proof. Without
any thorough consideration several courts ruled that the burden
of proof was on the commission to show that the charge was ex-
cessive and that the commission retained this burden even when
the company affected sought to enjoin the enforcement of the
commission's ruling.89 The effect of this view was shown by the
rulings of certain commissions which stated that they considered
the charges as unreasonable, but that they could not obtain the
books of the holding company and hence could not produce evi-
dence that this was true.9° Other commissions continued to fol-
low the earlier rule that the burden was on the company through-
out.- Despite extensive litigation before the commissions begin-
ning before 1915, it was not until 1923 that the American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company conceded temporarily that it was
defeated and voluntarily offered evidence before a state commis-
"Re Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (Ore. 1922) P. U. R. 1923 A, 531.
"Petersburg Gas Co. v. City of Petersburg (1922) 132 Va. 82; 110
S. E. 533.
'Swan v. Public Utilities Commission (D. C. D. Kan. 1922) 298 F. 114;
Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission (D. C. D. Ind. 1922)
P. U. R. 1922 B, 478 (not official reported); City of Lima v. Public Utilities
Commission (1922) 106 Oh. St. 379, 140 N. E. 147.
"Re Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. (Neb. 1922) P. U. R. 1923 B, 112; Re
Tonapah Sewer & Drainage Co. (Nev. 1922) P. U. R. 1922 C, 434.
Re Indiana Bell Tel. Co. (Ind. 1922) P. U. R. 1922 E, 46; Department
of Public Works v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (Wash. 1923) P. U. R. 1923
D, 113; Re West Union Gas Co. (W. Va. 1921) P. U. R. 1922 A, 657.
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sion showing the cost of the services it performed for the asso-
ciated companies. Even in this case, they contended that the
cost was an irrelevant factor and that the value to the local com-
pany was all that mattered.9 2 The zeal of one Federal District
Judge to follow what he believed was the ruling of the Houston
case that the cost to the affiliate of rendering the services was
immaterial led to one remarkable decision. Under it the com-
mission could subpoena what witnesses it desired and force them
to testify what would be a reasonable cost for rendering such
services, cross-examining them as to the costs shown by the ex-
perience of the companies with which they were connected; but
the commission could not subpoena the books of the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company.9 3 If the commission wished
to find out the contents of these books, all it would have to do is
subpoena the gentlemen who kept them.
THE PERIOD 1923-1930
Such was the law when the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1923 decided the case of Missouri ex rel. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission.0 This
was a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Missouri which had
upheld the ruling of the Missouri commission in the "St. Louis"
case involving the disallowance as an operating expense of a
large part of the 4 % contract charge on the ground that the
services, if any, rendered under it were valueless to the local
company. The case involved many other issues, but the majority
opinion clearly indicated its disapproval of the action of the
Missouri commission:
There is nothing to indicate bad faith. So far as appears
plaintiff in error's board of directors has exercised a proper
discretion about this matter requiring business judgment.
It must never be forgotten that while the State may regu-
late with a view to enforcing reasonable rates and charges,
it is not the owner of the properties of the public utility
companies and is not clothed with the general power of
management incident to ownership. The applicable general
rule is well expressed in State Public Utility Commission
"Re Indiana Bell Tel. Co. (Ind. P. S. C. 1923) P. U. R. 1924 A, 1.
"Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Railroad Commission (D. C. E. D. S. C.
1923) 299 F. 615.
(1923) 262 U. S. 276.
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ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield Gas and Electric Co. 291
Ill. 209, 234:
"The commission is not the financial manager of the cor-
poration; nor can it ignore items charged by the utility as
operating expenses unless there is an abuse of discretion in
that regard by the corporate officers."
This opinion written by Mr. Justice McReynolds represented the
views of seven members of the Court. Justices Brandeis and
Holmes concurred specially in the decision without mentioning
this issue. This majority opinion is startling to say the least.
We have seen that the Supreme Court of Illinois actually used
the quoted words, but nevertheless upheld commission action
exactly similar to that which the Supreme Court of the United
States considers to be forbidden by these words. The whole doc-
trine upon which the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court it-
self in the Wellman,95 Galveston,9 and Houston97 cases was based
is overturned without even a passing reference to these cases.
As we have seen there are cases which are actually precedents
for this view but they are not cited.99 Under this good faith
test it would seem not to matter how excessive the prices paid
were compared to the competitive cost of the services or supplies,
provided only the board of directors were sufficiently stupid or
inattentive not to realize that this was a fraud upon their own
corporation. It gives incompetence full privilege to mismanage
the property as it will and charge the cost of the folly to the
consumer."
However, it is possible to understand, although not to approve,
the reasons for the selection of these words. The counsel for
the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company argued the case on
the basis that the corporate entities involved could not be disre-
garded unless fraud was shown, using the same arguments which
they had urged in vain before the commission and the Missouri
" (1892) 143 U. S. 339.
(1921) 258 U. S. 388.
(1921) 259 U. S. 518.
They are discussed on page ?? and the following pages.
The treatment of this case in Bonbright and Means recent book The
Holding Company is very unsatisfactory. The authors think that this case
follows the Houston case in applying the competitive cost test and that
Justices Holmes and Brandeis strongly dissented on this subject. As a
matter of fact the concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis (adopted also by
Justice Holmes) did not mention this point, being solely concerned with the
question of what is a fair value.
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Supreme Court. The counsel for the City of St. Louis were
primarily concerned with the question of the rate base. In their
treatment of operating costs they too argued the case on the
ground of disregarding the corporate entity, claiming that this
was possible even where there was no fraud. Under such cir-
cumstances it is natural for the opinion to talk in terms of fraud.
Furthermore the attention of all the justices seems largely to
have centered upon the conflict between the majority and Jus-
tices Brandeis and Holmes on whether the rule of Smyth v. Ames
should be abandoned in favor of the prudent investment theory
of valuation. It was sufficient to authorize a reversal that the
Court found that the valuation was too low under either theory.
The result of this decision was great confusion and uncer-
tainty. Many commissions accepted the new order of things as
imposed by a superior power,00 although some grumbled much
over this result.2°1 Other commissions accepted it without any
seeming reluctance but took the precaution to investigate and
hold that the charges involved could have been supported on the
basis that they were no higher than competitive prices'0 2 or were
based upon the cost to the holding company. 0 3 Innumerable
cases were before the lower federal courts during this period or
were litigated in state courts. As might be expected in the in-
ferior federal courts there was a tendency to blindly follow the
"Re Indiana Bell Tel. Co. (Ind. 1926) P. U. R. 1926 C, 785; Re New
England Tel. & Tel. Co. (Me. 1925) P. U. R. 1926 B, 247; Re Michigan
Bell Tel. Co. (Mich. 1926) P. U. R. 1926 C, 607; Re New York Tel Co.
(N. Y. 1926) P. U. R. 1926 E, 1; Re New York Tel. Co. (N. Y. 1930)
P. U. R. 1930 C, 325.
"I Citizens' Association v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. (D. C. 1924)
P. U. R. 1924 D. 154; Re New England Tel. & Tel. Co. (Mass. 1925) P. U.
R. 1925 E, 739; Public Service Commission v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co. (Mont. 1924) P. U. R. 1924 C, 545; Re Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.
(Minn. 1926) P. U. R. 1926 C, 624; In Re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. (1924)
15 Mo. P. S. C. 58; Re Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. (Neb. 1929) P. U. R. 1929 E,
512; Re Lincoln Tel & Tel. Co. (Neb. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 E, 438; Re New
England Tel. & Tel. Co. (N. H. 1926) P. U. R. 1926 E, 186; Borough of
Wyoming v. Luzerne Gas & Electric Co. (Pa. 1923) P. U. R. 1923 D, 80;
City of Erie v. Mutual Tel. Co. (Pa. 1930) P. U. R. 1931 A, 169; Re New
England Tel. Co. (Vt. 1926) P. U. R. 1927 B, 348; Re Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. of West Virginia (W. Va. 1924) P. U. R. 1925 C, 570.
"Re New England Tel. & Tel. Co. (Me. 1925) P. U. R. 1926 B, 247;
Public Service Commission v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. (Mont.
1924) P. U. R. 1924 C, 545; New England Tel. & Tel. Co. (Vt. 1927)
P. U. R. 1927 C, 348.
"Re New England Tel. & Tel. Co. (Mass. 1925) P. U. R. 1925 E, 739;
Re New York Tel. Co. (N. Y. 1923) P. U. R. 1923 B, 545; Public Utiliites
Co. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. (R. I. 1925) P. U. R. 1926 C, 207.
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decision in the Southwestern Bell case,104 but even in these bod-
ies some reluctance was shown.105 Some special masters in tak-
ing evidence made findings that the contracts were reasonable
and also were made in good faith.' The state supreme courts
tended to consider the problem more thoroughly, but even there
the mere citation of the quoted passage from the Southwestern
Bell case was normally considered as conclusive.07 A result of
the use of the good faith test was a sharp decline in cases in
which those commissions even mentioned operating expenses.
Practically, it was difficult or impossible to show an abuse of
discretion; therefore there was no use wasting time in even dis-
cussing operating expenses.
A few commissions used various expedients to annoy holding
companies whose charges the commission considered extortion-
ate, although the commission stated that they could not directly
interfere with these items. Thus, the California Railroad Com-
mission refused to allow one of the Associated Companies of the
Bell system to plead lack of money as a ground for failure to
provide proper service in the Los Angeles district, then under-
going a boom expansion, pointing to the contractual obligation
of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company to supply
' Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission (D. C. D. Ind.
1924) 300 F. 190; Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Whitman (D. C. D.
Md. 1925) 3 F. (2d) 938; Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Railroad Com-
mission (D. C. E. D. S. C. 1925) 5 F. (2d) 77; Citizens Gas Co. v. Public
Service Commission (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 632; New York &
Richmond Gas Co. v. Prendergast (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1925) 10 F. (2d) 167;
Monroe Gaslight & Fuel Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission (D.
C. E. D. Mich. 1926) 11 F. (2d) 319; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Whitcomb
(D. C. W. D. Wash. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 279; Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. v.
Prendergast (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 651; New York Tel. Co.
v. Prendergast (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 54; Michigan Bell
Tel. Co. v. Odell (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 180.
'"Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Whitman (D. C. D. Md. 1925) 3 F.
(2d) 938. Some Federal courts did not follow the Southwestern Bell case.
They are cited in note 113.
'New York & Richmond Gas Co. v. Prendergast (D. C. E. D. N. Y.
1925) 10 F. (2d) 167; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Whitcomb (D. C. D. Wash.
1926) 12 F. (2d) 279.
' Columbus Gaslight Co. v. Public Service Commission (1923) 193 Ind.
399,140 N. E. 538; State ex rel. Hopkins v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.
(1924) 115 Kan. 236,223 Pac. 771; Wichita Gas Co. v. Public Service Co.
(1928) 126 Kan. 220,268 Pac. 111; Michigan Public Utility Commission v.
Michigan State Tel. Co. (1924) 228 Mich. 658,200 N. W. 749; City of Cin-
cinnati v. Public Utilities Commission (1925) 113 Oh. St. 259,148 N. E. 817;
City of Huntingdon v. Public Service Conmssion (1926) 101 W. Va. 378,133
S. E. 144.
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all necessary funds.108  Another device was sanctioned by the
Virginia Court of Appeals. This involved the reduction of the
allowance for going concern value on the ground that the hold-
ing company could easily reconstitute the local subsidiary.109 A
few commissions took the stand that payment of unreasonable
sums was sufficient evidence of abuse of discretion.110 The Mis-
souri Public Service Commission adopted the view that it would
allow any other company that desired to do so to enter into
competition with a public utility that bought gas from an affili-
ate. This decision said that the requirement of a certificate of
convenience and necessity was designed to protect regulated mo-
nopolies, while such a company was essentially an unregulated
monopoly.", Even in these times some local companies neglected
to claim as operating expenses sums paid affiliated companies.
Thus, in an application for a rate increase made in 1929 by the
Laclede Gaslight Company no claim was made for the allowance
of a management fee amounting to $212,000.00 annually, al-
though it was shown as paid on exhibits filed in the case.11
Many commissions and courts more or less boldly championed
their former views that the commission might disallow operating
expenses if they were shown to be unreasonable. In so doing the
opinions do not explicitly state that they consider the South-
'western Bell case unsound; they merely do not apply its doctrine
(even when they cite it as authority for what they are doing).
In six cases inferior federal courts considered that the issue was
whether or not the sums charged were reasonable, as tested by
competitive costs, actually applying the test of the Houston
case.", The Missouri Supreme Court arrived at a similar con-
clusion by the use of some very interesting language :14
"'Re Southern California Tel. Co. (Cal. 1923) P. U. R. 1924 C, 506.
"' Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Virginia v. Commonwealth (1927)
147 W. Va. 43,136 S. E. 575. It was of course also possible to achieve a
similar result by disregarding the corporate entities involved.
"'Re Indiana Bell Tel. Co. (Ind. P. S. C. 1923) P. U. R. 1924 A, 1;
Re Citizens' Independent Tel. Co. (Ind. P. S. C. 1929) P. U. R. 1930 A, 431;
Rexford Volunteer Fire Dept. v. Rexford Water Co. (Mont. P. S. C. 1929)
P. U. R. 1929 E, 456.
u Re Industrial Gas Co. (Mo. 1928) P. U. R. 1929 A, 516.
"In Re Laclede Gaslight Co. (1929) 17 Mo. P. S. C. 206.
"United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission (D. C. E. D. Ky. 1925)
13 F. (2d) 511; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission (D. C.
S. D. W. Va. 1926) 14 W. (2d) 209; Idaho Power Co. v. J. M. Thompson
(D. C. D. Idaho 1927) 19 F. (2d) 547; New York Tel. Co. v. Prendergast
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 54; Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Moynihan
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But it must be kept in mind that the Commission's au-
thority to regulate does not include the right to dictate the
manner in which the company shall conduct its business.
The company has a lawful right to manage its affairs and
conduct its business in any manner it may choose, provided
that in so doing it does not injuriously affect the public.
The customers of a public utility have a right to demand
efficient service at a reasonable rate, but they have no right
to dictate the methods which the utility must employ in the
rendition of that service. It is no concern of either the cus-
tomers of the utility or the Commission if the water com-
pany obtains necessary material, labor, supplies, etc., for
the holding company so long as the quality and price of the
service rendered by the water company are what the law
says they should be. . . . We cannot say that the hold-
ing company did not render valuable services to the water
company, or that the 3 % charged therefor was not a reason-
able charge.
This language is a statement of the older orthodox view and yet
the Court cites the Southwestern Bell case as authority."6
There are two decisions of the United States Supreme Court
during this period which lent some comfort to the view that
after all the correct test was the reasonableness of the charge.
In Bluefiels Water Works & Improvement Co. v. West Virginia
Public Service Commission1 6 the rate of return was fixed upon
the assumption that there must be "efficient and economical
management." This case was decided the same year as the
Southwestern Bell case and refers to the latter with reference
to the proper method by which to determine a fair value. In
1929 the Supreme Court was called upon to decide a case in
which the affiliate had been set up apparently to divert profits
from the regulated public utility. Natural gas contains gaso-
line which may profitably be extracted therefrom before the gas
is sold. The West Virginia commission had ruled that the utility
business of the company must be credited with 50% of the profit
(D. C. N. D. Ill. 1930) 38 F. (2d) 77 (it was the appeal of this sub nom.
Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. which finally settled the law); West Ohio
Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1930) 42 F. (2d)
899.
, State ex rel. City of St. Joseph v. Public Service Commission (1930)
325 Mo. 209, 30 S. W. (2d) 8.
"' The only other authority cited was Citizens Gas Co. v. Public Service
Commission (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 632 which merely quoted
from the Southwestern Bell case.
(1923) 262 U. S. 679.
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derived by the company from its own operations in extracting
the gasoline. After this decision the holding company set up a
separate affiliate which made a contract with the utility by which
the affiliate was to extract the gasoline and give the utility only
121% of the net profit. This arrangement was disallowed by
the commission. A writ of error to the Court of Appeals of
West Virginia was sued out after it had made a decision uphold-
ing the action of the commission. The Supreme Court upheld
the action of the commission: 11
We need not labor the point that a public service corpora-
tion may not make a rate confiscatory by reducing its net
earnings by the device of a corporation unduly favoring a
subsidiary or corporation owned by its stockholders. Chi-
cago & Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Wellman 143 U. S.
339. . . We recognize that a Public Service Commis-
sion, under the guise of establishing a fair rate, may not
usurp the functions of the company's directors and in every
case substitute its judgment for theirs as to the propriety
of the contracts entered into by the utility; and common
ownership is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding
such intercorporate agreements when it appears that, al-
though an affiliated corporation may be receiving the larger
share of the profits, the regulated company is still receiving
substantial benefits from the contract and probably could
not have secured better terms elsewhere. Missouri ex rel.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion 262 U. S. 276; Houston v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co. 259 U. S. 319.
But this case is not of that class. It is not without sig-
nificance that the West Virginia Court in considering this
question had before it the previous findings of its Commis-
sion, based upon actual contracts for gasoline extraction,
where the parties, dealing at arm's length, had agreed upon
a 50% division. . . . Making allowance for the fluctua-
tion in the market price and other common business haz-
ards, we do not think it would be difficult to induce capital
to seek investment upon the basis of this division of net
earnings. In such circumstances we think no adequate rea-
son is shown for not including in appellant's earnings 50%
of the net proceeds from the gasoline extraction.
This language of Mr. Justice Stone is gratifying in that it at
" This case also disposed of an appeal from a federal district court in
the case of United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, cited above in note
113. It is generally styled United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission(1929) 278 U. S. 300.
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last recognizes the bearing of the Wellman case upon the point
under discussion even though it cites that case for a point that
it did not hold, since there was no reference to contracts unduly
favoring other corporations in that case. It is somewhat startl-
ing to find the Houston and Southwestern Bell cases cited as
affirming the same point when their language was so different.
The case follows the competitive cost theory for determining
reasonableness, but it does hint, particularly in the second of
the quoted paragraphs at the application of a more objective
test, based in part at least upon probable cost to the affiliate.
The importance of this case was not recognized at the time.
The commissions which during this period refused to follow
the good faith test of the Southwestern Bell case, representing
by far the greater number, if we merely count the number of
their decisions, did not reach any unanimous agreement with ref-
erence to the criteria by which reasonableness of the charge was
to be determined. Many commissions found it sufficient to de-
cide the case before them to hold that no valuable services what-
soever were rendered in return for the sums paid out. This
conclusion could be drawn in either of two fact situations. In
the first and simplest the affiliate merely did nothing at all which
was for the benefit of the local company, although its existence
might be beneficial to the holding company for its aid in super-
vizing the investment position of the holding company's stock
interest in the local company.', 8 More frequently, the commis-
sion considered that the utility already had sufficient executives
to perform the services if they would only work instead of leav-
ing it all to the affiliate. 1 9
" Re Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. (Cal. 1930) P. U. R. 1931 A, 132;
Re Minier Tel. Co. (Ill. 1929) P. U. R. 1929 E, 235; Re Salomonia Tel. Co.
(Ind. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 E, 39; Re Johnson County Tel. Co. (Ind. 1930)
P. U. R. 1931 A, 446; Re LaFontaine Tel. Co. (Ind. 1930) P. U. R. 1931
A, 94; Capital City Water Co. (Mo. 1928) P. U. R. 1928 C, 436; Re Cam-
bridge Home Tel. Co. (Ohio 1930) P. U. R. 1930 E, 65; School Directors v.
Highspire Water Supply Co. (Pa. 1926) P. U. R. 1926 D, 80.
"Re Western States Gas & Electric Co. (Cal. 1924) P. U. R. 1924 D,
681; Re Rodeo-Vallejo Ferry Co. (Cal. 1925) P. U. R. 1925 E, 508; Home
Tel. Co. (Ind. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 D, 481; Public Utilities Commission v.
Gould El. Co. (Me. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 D, 289; Re Inter-County Tel. Co.
(Mo. 1930) P. U. R. 1931 B, 5; Re Springfield City Water Co. (Mo. 1930)
P. U. R. 1931 B, 80; Buck v. International Ry. Co. (N. Y. 1925) P. U. R.
1925 C, 782; Re International Ry. Co. (N. Y. 1927) P. U. R. 1927 D, 630;
Knoxville v. South Pittsburg Water Co. (Pa. 1927) P. U. R. 1928 B, 206;
Re West Virginia Central Gas Co. (W. Va. 1924) 1924 E, 24; Re Cumber-
land & Allegheny Gas Co. (W. Va. 1927) P. U. R. 1928 B, 20.
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When such conclusions were not possible, most of the commis-
sions followed the Houston case and adopted the competitive
cost test.20 Yet, many commissions recognized that this was
impossible of practical application unless there was an open
market for the services or supplies involved. Very frequently
this did not exist. Under such conditions, these commissions
based the sum allowed upon the cost to the affiliate plus a rea-
sonable profit.u1
With the commissions and the courts expressing such varied
views as to the test by which to determine whether or not the
charges should be allowed, it is not surprising that there was
" Wayne Public Safety Ass'n v. Public Service Commission (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1928) P. U. R. 1929 A, 158; Re River Falls Power Co. (Ala. 1930)
P. U. R. 1930 E, 97; Re Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. (Ariz. 1929)
P. U. R. 1929 D, 414; Re Public Service Co. (Col. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 D,
21; East St. Louis & Interurban Water Co. (Ill. 1927) P. U. R. 1928 A, 57;
Re Home Tel. Co. (1923) 14 Mo. P. S. C. 41; Re Laclede Gaslight Co. (Mo.
1929) P. U. R. 1929 A, 561; Rexford Volunteer Fire Department v. Rexford
Water Co. (Mont. 1929) P. U. R. 1929 E, 456; Ginocchio Brothers v. Board
of County Commissioners (Nev. 1923) P. U. R. 1924 A, 302; Re Tonapah
Sewer & Drainage Co. (Nev. 1923) P. U. R. 1924 A, 837; Re Logan Gas Co.
(Ohio 1928) P. U. R. 1929 A, 232; Re Purcell-Lexington Toll Bridge Co.
(Okla. 1924) P. U. R. 1925 A, 253; Re Coos & Curry Tel. Co. (Ore. 1924)
P. U. R. 1924 E, 344; Herring v. Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. (Pa. 1926) P. U.R.
1926 D, 514; Nace v. McConnelsberg Water Co. (Pa. 1926) P. U. R. 1926
E, 248; Sharp v. Newville Water Co. (Pa. 1928) P. U. R. 1929 B, 320;
Dept. of Public Works v. Pacific Power & Light Co. (Wash. 1929) P. U. R.
1929 D, 55; Re United Fuel Gas Co. (W. Va. 1925) P. U. R. 1925 B, 705;
Re Ashland Water Co. (Wis. 1924) P. U. R. 1925 A, 705; Re Madison Ry.
Co. (Wis. 1928) P. U. R. 1928 C, 842; Re Cheyenne Light, Fuel & Power
Co. (Wyo. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 E, 114.
In a few cases this comparison has taken the form of comparing the
total expenses of supervision and allowing a lump sum for these items.
Re Houghton County Electric Light Co. (Mich. 1923) P. U. R. 1924 B, 32;
In Re Capital City Water Co. (1927) 16 Mo. P. S. C. 637; Wood v. Elmira
Water, Light & R. R. Co. (N. Y. 1926) P. U. R. 1927 B, 400; Minersville v.
Minersville Water Co. (Pa. 1926) P. U. B. 1926 E, 147.
'Re Southern California Tel. Co. (Cal. 1924) P. U. B. 1925 C, 827;
Re Los Angeles Gas Co. (Cal. 1927) P. U. R. 1927 C, 545; Re Pacific Tel. &
Tel. Co. (Cal. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 C, 481; Re Selectmen of the Town of
Amesbury (Mass. 1928) P. U. R. 1928 B, 581; Re West St. Louis Water Co.
(1929) 17 Mo. P. S. C. 563; City of PoIson v. Public Utilities Consolidated
Corp. (Mont. 1929) P. U. R. 1929 E, 577; Re New York Tel. Co. (N. J.
1924) P. U. R. 1925 C, 767; Re Logan Gas Co. (Ohio 1928) P. U. R. 1929
A, 232; Re Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (Ore. 1924) P. U. B. 1924 D, 39; Re New
England Tel. & Tel. Co. (R. I.) P. U. R. 1926 C, 207; Re Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. (Va. 1926) P. U. B. 1926 E, 481; Department of Public
Works v. Pacific Power & Light Co. (Wash. 1929) P. U. R. 1929 D, 54;
Re Wisconsin Tel. Co. (Wis. 1925) P. U. R. 1925 D, 611; Re Wisconsin Tel.
Co. (Wis. 1925) P. U. B. 1926 B, 628; Re Wisconsin Tel. Co. (Wis. 1926)
P. U. R. 1927 A, 581; Re City Water Co. of Marinette (Wis. 1928) P. U. B.
1929 A, 243; Re St. Croix Valley Tel. Co. (Wis. 1929) P. U. R. 1929 B, 597.
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hopeless conflict as to the issue of who must bear the burden of
proof as to the necessary facts. When the Southwestern Bell
case was followed and good faith made the determining factor,
the decisions are unanimous in placing the burden upon the com-
mission. 12 2  Such a result is natural inasmuch as there is ordi-
narily a presumption that all persons act honestly. Moreover,
it is implied from the very wording of the opinion of the Court
in the Southwestern Bell case which says in the absence of spe-
cific evidence "There is nothing to indicate bad faith." Whero
the inquiry is whether or not the charge is reasonable, almost
all commissions continued to hold that the burden was on the
company to sustain its charges by proof meeting whatever cri-
teria of reasonableness might be fixed by the commission. 1 23
Where the contract had been filed with the commission and no
action taken on it, there was a tendency to allow the contract
price until it was attacked in a direct proceeding.- 4  By the
weight of authority, the commission need not make the other
contracting party a party to the proceedings before the commis-
sion. 121 If the burden of proof be placed upon the commission,
it may desire to subpoena the books of the holding company. If
it can secure valid service within the state upon the holding com-
pany, it can force the production of these books, provided they
' Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Spillman (D. C. D. Neb. 1925) 6 F. (2d)
663; New York & Richmond Gas Co. v. Prendergast (D. C. E. D. N. Y.
1925) 10 F. (2d) 167; Re New England Tel. & Tel. Co. (Me. 1925) P. U. R.
1926 B, 247; Billings v. Billings Gas Co. (Mont. 1924) P. U. R. 1924 C,
217; Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Hughes Electric Co. (N. D. 1924)
P. U. R. 1925 A, 18; Re New England Tel. & Tel. Co. (N. H. 1926) P. U. R.
1926 E, 186. Such a view is implicit in the cases cited in notes 101-107.
" Re Home Tel. Co. (Ind. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 D, 481; Public Utilities
Commission v. Gould Electric Co. (Me. 1930) P. U. R. 1930 D, 289; Re Red
River Power Co. (N. D. 1923) P. U. R. 1923 E, 534; Re Northern States
Power Co. (N. D. 1923) P. U. R. 1924 A, 325; Re New York Tel. Co. (N. J.
1925) P. U. R. 1925 C, 767; Re Delaware & Atlantic Tel. Co. (N. J. 1924)
P. U. R. 1925 D, 60; Re Dayton Power & Light Co. (Ohio 1930) P. U. R.
1931 A, 332; Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Lehigh Navigation Electric Co.(Pa. 1924) P. U. R. 1924 E, 737; Re Point Pleasant Natural Gas Co. (W.
Va. 1927) P. U. R. 1927 B, 804; Re Wisconsin Tel. Co. (Wis. 1925) P. U. R.
1925 D, 660; Re St. Croix Valley Tel. Co. (Wis. 1929) P. U. R. 1929 B, 597.
"' New York & Queens Gas Co. v. Prendergast (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1924)
1 F. (2d) 351; Public Service Commission v. Great Northern Utilities Co.
(Mont. P. S. C. 1929) P. U. R. 1929 B, 176.
Williams v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. (1932) 164 Tenn. 313, 47
S. W. (2d) 358; Gunn v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Cal. 1926) P. U. R.
1927 B, 658; Re Utility Gas Co. (W. Va. 1925) P. U. R. 1926 A, 57; contra:
Municipal Gas Co. v. City of Wichita Falls (Tex. 1923) P. U. R. 1924
B, 410.
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are relevant to the inquiry being made by the commission. 120
However, if the holding company is not doing business within
the state, the holding company is not subject to the jurisdiction
of the state and cannot be validly served with process.127 It is
not enough that the holding company owns all the stock of a
company which is doing business within the state.128
THE PERIOD AFTER 1930
Such was the confused and uncertain state of the law, when
the subject was at last clarified by another pronouncement of
the Supreme Court of the United States. In December 1930
Chief Justice Hughes handed down the decision in Smith v. Illi-
nois Bell Telephone Co.1 29 The Court first ruled that mere com-
plete stock ownership was not sufficient to authorize the disre-
garding of the corporate entity. The lower federal court had
expressly found that the contract was made in good faith and
that the services and supplies could not be obtained more cheaply
elsewhere. Nevertheless the case was remanded for further
findings with these words:
That fact (that the Western Electric Company's average
annual profits had ranged between 7% and 10%) had evi-
dentiary value but the finding does not go far enough. The
Western Electric Company not only manufactured appar-
atus for the licensees of the Bell system, but engaged in
other large operations and it cannot be merely assumed or
conjectured that the net earnings on the entire business rep-
resent the net earnings from the sale to the Bell licensees
generally or from those to the Illinois Company. Nor is the
argument of the appellants answered by a mere comparison
of the prices charged by the Western Electric Company to
the Illinois Company with the higher prices charged by
other manufacturers for comparable materials or by the
Western Electric Company to independent telephone com-
panies. The point of appellant's contention is that the
Western Electric Company, through the organization and
' Gilchrist v. Dahl (1927) 130 Misc. 456, 224 N. Y. S. 210; Marinette v.
Menominee & Marinette Light & Traction Co. (Wis. 1927) P. U. R. 1927
E, 708.
'New Hampshire Gas & Electric Co. v. Morse (D. C. D. N. H. 1930)
42 F. (2d) 490.
'New Hampshire Gas & Electric Co. v. Morse, above; Philadelphia &
Reading Co. v. McKibbin (1917) 243 U. S. 264; Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy
Packing Co. (1924) 267 U. S. 330. Of course, it may be possible to find
conduct which will justify disregard of the corporate entity.
'(1930) 282 U. S. 133.
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control of the American Company, occupied a special posi-
tion with particular advantage in relation to the manufac-
ture and sale of equipment to the licensees of the Bell sys-
tem, including the Illinois Company, that is, that it was vir-
tually the manufacturing department for that system, and
the question is as to the net earnings of the Western Elec-
tric Company realized in that department and the extent to
which, if at all, such profit figures in the estimate upon
which the charge of confiscation is predicated. We think
there should be findings upon this point . ..
In view of the findings both of the State Commission and
of the Court we see no reason to doubt that valuable ser-
vices were rendered by the American Company, but there
should be specific findings by the statutory court with re-
gard to the costs of those services to the American Company
and the reasonable amount which should be allocated in
this respect to the operating expenses of the Illinois
Company.
This decision is noteworthy. It rejects the doctrine of the South-
western Bell case that good faith was the test. It also rejects
under the special circumstances here alleged the doctrine of the
Houston case that comparative costs were a sufficient criterion
to determine reasonableness. Where there is no competitive
market in which all sellers have equal opportunities, it demands
a finding as to the costs of the affiliated seller and would appar-
ently allow the sum fixed as reasonable to be based on these (at
least if below the competitive price). In fixing this cost, the
Court would apparently allow a reasonable profit to the affiliate.
Since there must be a finding in order to obtain a permanent
injunction, it practically places the burden of proof on the utility
to show these costs, for if they are not shown the permanent
injunction must be denied and the temporary injunction will fall
when the case is finally dismissed. However, it is erroneous to
consider this decision as revolutionary or a radical innovation
as some have done.130 We have seen that it is a mere return to
the sound principles which prevailed before the springs of judi-
cial wisdom were muddied by the Houston and Southwestern
Bell opinions.
'" Both Professor Bonbright and Mr. Lillienthal (then chairman of the
Wisconsin commission, now a member of the Tennessee Valley Authority)
fell into this error. Lillienthal, Recent Developments in the Law of Public
Utility Holding Companies, (1931) 31 Col. L. R. 189, and Bonbright, Com-
ment thereon, at 208.
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The burden of proof of the reasonableness of the charges
involved is on the local company. This is the clear intimation
of Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company where a finding
on the subject of cost is made a condition precedent to a valid
permanent injunction. Obviously there can be no finding if
there is no evidence; therefore it becomes the duty of the local
company to produce the evidence upon which a finding can be
based or it will not get the permanent injunction it is seeking.
The commissions have adopted this view to cases before them
by requiring similar proof by the local utility.131 This is, of
course, the mere reaffirmance of what we have seen to be the
doctrine which prevailed in almost all states in which the test
of reasonableness was used prior to the Smith case. Whatever
doubts may have once existed on this subject ought to have been
forever set at rest by the language used by the Supreme Court
of the United States in February 1932 in deciding the case of
Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission of
Kansas.132
Having in mind the affiliation of buyer and seller and the
unity of control thus engendered, we think the position of
the appellees (the commission) and that the court below
was right in holding that if the appellant (the local com-
pany) desired an increase of rates it was bound to offer sat-
isfactory evidence with respect to all the costs which en-
tered into the ascertainment of a reasonable rate. Those
in control of the situation have combined the interstate car-
riage of the commodity with its local distribution into what
is in practical effect one organization. There is an absence
of arms' length bargaining between the two corporate enti-
ties involved and of all the elements which ordinarily go to
fix market value. The opportunity exists for one member
of the combination to charge the other an unreasonable rate
for the gas furnished and thus to make such unfair charge
in part the basis of the retail rate. The state authority
California Farm Bureau Federation v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co.
(Cal. 1932) P. U. R. 1932 D, 310; Re Atlanta Gaslight Co. (Ga. 1931)
P. U. R. 1931 E, 461; Re Cayuga Omnibus Corp. (N. Y. 1931) P. U. R.
1931 C, 238; Re Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. (Ohio 1932) P. U. R. 1933 A
337, and confer cases cited in notes 133 to 148 below, where similar views
are implied.
(1932) 285 U. S. 119. A similar result was reached in a decision
handed down a few days latter by a federal district court. International
Railway Co. v. Prendergast (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 623.
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whose powers are invoked to fix a reasonable rate are cer-
tainly entitled to be informed whether advantage has been
taken of the situation to put an unreasonable burden upon
the distributing company, and the mere fact that the charge
is made for an interstate service does not constrain the
Commission to desist from all inquiry as to its fairness.
Any other rule would make possible the gravest injustice,
and would tie the hands of the state authority in such fash-
ion that it could not effectively regulate the intrastate ser-
vice which unquestionably lies within its jurisdiction.
The argument is made that the proofs demanded by the
Commission will involve an extensive and unnecessary val-
uation of the pipe line company's property and an analysis
of its business, and that this burden should not be thrown
upon the appellant. Whether this so, we need not now de-
cide. It is enough to say that in view of the relation of the
parties and the power implicit therein arbitrarily to fix and
maintain costs as respects the distributing company which
do not represent the true value of the service rendered, the
state authority is entitled to a fair showing of the reason-
ableness of such costs, although this may involve a presen-
tation of evidence which would not be required in the case
of parties dealing at arms' length and in the general and
open market, subject to the usual safeguards of bargaining
and competition.
It will of course be observed that the language used in this
case does not hold that the allowable price to be charged by the
affiliate must not be more than a fair return upon a fair value.
Instead, the word "cost" is used which would ordinarily signify
a definite bookkeeping figure. based either on the historical cost
of the particular property involved, or upon the amount of capi-
tal that would be required to reproduce a plant capable of fur-
nishing the same service or commodity under present conditions.
The controversy between the Cities Service Company and the
Kansas Public Utilities Commission over the so-called city gate
rates at which the pipe-line companies sold gas to the local dis-
tributing companies continued even after this decision. The
Commission proceeded to value the property of the affiliated
natural gas-producing companies in the same manner as it
would value any ordinary public utility property and issued an
order restraining the local distributing companies from setting
up on their books any payments to these companies in excess of
what the Commission found to be a fair price for the natural
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gas supplied.133 The Federal District Court granted an injunc-
tion,13 4 but this action was reversed by the Supreme Court on the
ground that there was no irreparable injury since order did not
fix new rates based upon this new and reduced statement of
operating expenses but was only a step towards such an order
which had not yet been made.135
Meanwhile the legal principles involved in such cases were
settled by two cases involving appeals from the Supreme Court of
Ohio. In the case of Dayton Power & Light Company v. Public
Utilities Commission (decided on April 30, 1934) I' the Ohio
Commission had valued the property of the affiliated producing
and transportation companies as though they were part of the
local public utility whose rates were subject to commission con-
trol. The Ohio Supreme Court had sustained this action of the
Commission but had reversed the decision on the ground that
the conunission had improperly allowed the deduction of an
amortization charge as to natural gas leases. The decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the action of
the Commission. The company contended that the rates charged
in the contract between the affiliated companies were binding,
but Justice Cardozo stated: "They were not dealing at arm's
length and the prices they fixed in their inter-company transac-
tions were of no concern to the consumers unless kept within
the bounds of reason." It must be confessed that this language,
standing alone, would not have been a great aid in reaching a
proper determination, but when explained by the course of ac-
tion sanctioned by the Court, it is'clear that the highest allow-
able price to be charged by the affiliate cannot exceed a fair re-
turn upon a fair value of the affiliate's property. In a factually
connected case decided slightly later in the same term, this was
expressly stated to be the law.'
137
The commissions had in general been following this doctrine
even before these decisions. 38 In some cases the opinions still
'-'Re Cities Service Co. (Kan. 1932) P. U. R. 1933 A, 113.
"I Wichita Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission (D. C. D. Kan. 1933)
3 F. Supp. 722.
' State Corporation Commission v. Wichita Gas Co. (1934) 54 S. Ct. 321.(1934) 54 S. Ct. 647.
Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (1934) 54
S. Ct. 764.
Montana Public Service Commission v. Billings Gas Co. (Mont. 1933)
P. U. R. 1933 D, 337; Re Illinois Power Co. (I1. 1931) P. U. R. 1932 A, 122;
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speak of "cost," but a reading of these opinions clearly shows
that the affiliate either bought the electric current or natural gas
supplied from other non-affiliated companies or produced the
electric current under such circumstances that the fuel and la-
bor costs were almost the sole elements to be considered.1 3 9
There seems to have been no realization that the affiliate which
produces the electric current or natural gas is not a public
utility, has not dedicated its property to public use and hence
could not be compelled to continue to supply electric current or
natural gas. It is, of course, true that in a time of depression a
natural gas pipe line is glad to continue to sell to a local distribut-
ing company, but in a time of industrial expansion it may well
be that the entire capacity of the pipe-line could be sold to a
few large industries along its route. If the demand was suffici-
ent to allow charging these industries a high price for natural
gas, it might well pay the holding company to shut off the flow
of natural gas to the local distributing company (which could
not meet such a price, as it is assumed to be more than a fair
return upon a fair value of the property of the producing com-
panies). This would involve the financial ruin of the local com-
pany, but the greater profits to its other subsidiaries might more
than repay this loss to the holding company.
Re Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. (Ohio 1931) P. U. R. 1931 C, 244; Re East
Ohio Gas Co. (Ohio 1934) 4 P. U. R. (N. S.) 433; Re Lone Star Gas Co.(Okla. 1933) P. U. R. 1933 C, 1; Re United Gas System (1934) 4 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 285.
The Missouri Commission in November 1932 accepted tentatively the
contract figure for electric current supplied by an affiliate even though it
was at a rate higher than paid by other companies in similar situations,
saying there was "no evidence in this case which would justify the Com-
mission in impugning the reasonableness of this contract. Re Missouri
Utilities Co. P. U. R. 1932 E, 449. This probably represents an oversight
by the commission. In a case in which the return which would have to be
allowed if a fair return on a fair value was to be used was fifty percent
higher than the agreed rental, the New York Commission held that the
agreed rental was the maximum that should be allowed. Re Yonkers R. R.
Co. P. U. R. 1933 B, 61. The lower Federal court in Central Kentucky
Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission (D. C. E. D. Ky. 1932) 60
F. (2d) 137 thought the agreed rental was probably the correct figure to
use, but agrees to value the property concerned and allow a fair return on
it as this would be more advantageous to the consumers and the company
insists. This case was reversed outright by the Supreme Court on the
ground the lower court had lost jurisdiction when it had set aside the
original rates and could not now go ahead and fix new rates.
' Hopper v. Lassen El. Co. (Cal. 1932) P. U. R. 1933 B, 277; Marlbor-
ough v. Marlborough El. Co. (Mass. 1934) 4 P. U. R. (N. S.) 86; Common-
wealth ex rel. Rosslyn Gas Co. (Va. 1933) 3 P. U. R. (N. S.) 61; City of
Wheeling v. Natural Gas Co. (W. Va. 1933) P. U. R. 1933 D, 1.
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The problem of the correct treatment of management con-
tracts, charges for intangible services, and charges for materials
sold to the local company is far more difficult than that presented
by contracts involving the supply at wholesale to the local utility
of the very thing the local utility is retailing to the public.
It may be worthwhile to examine in some detail the manner
in which the courts and the commissions have dealt with the li-
cense contract binding the Associated Companies of the Bell
system to their parent and the privilege which this contract
gives to its signers to purchase supplies from the Western Elec-
tric Company as special rates below those charged to outsiders.
At one extreme is the action of the Massachusetts commission
which allowed the charges with the mere statement that they
had been before the commission in 1925 and were not "detri-
mental" to the local telephone company.140 The only authority
cited for this method of treating these charges is the outmoded
Southwestern Bell case. The other extreme is represented by
the Oregon commissions which has recently forbidden any pay-
ments under the license contract.'4 The lower court to which
the Illinois Bell Telephone Company case was returned for fur-
ther findings referred the whole subject to a special master.
He took considerable testimony and was furnished with many
exhibits. Thereafter the court made detailed findings concern-
ing the total cost to the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company of performing the various services performed by it.
With the exception of a claim for an allowance for loss of inter-
est occasioned by the fact that the American Company kept
large sums in short term securities so as to be able to meet any
demand for funds by the Associated Companies, the court al-
lowed all the various items claimed by the American Company
as proper items of expense under the license contract. During
"
4 0Re New England Tel. & Tel. Co. (Mass. 1934) 5 P. U. R. (N. S.) 333.
" Re Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (Ore. 1933) 2 P. U. R. (N. S.) 384. This
order was under the new Oregon Statute (Laws 1933 ch. 641) giving the
Commission authority to reject in advance any expenditure and barring the
setting up of such expenditures as operating expenses in a rate case and
further providing as to any expenditure which the Commission deems "im-
prudent and unwise" the Commission may forbid the payment of the money
involved out of the corporate treasury. The same order set up a wholely
new and reduced salary schedule which the commission said was the maxi-
mum it would allow as operating expenses. The effective date of this order
was postponed from time to time, but it is now in force. Public Utilities
Fortnightly for Nov. 22, 1934 at 702.
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the earlier years of the period under scrutiny the payments un-
der the license contract were considerably in excess of the ex-
pense of rendering the service, but during 1931 and 1932 the
cost of rendering the service was more than the payments under
the license contract. The court also investigated the prices
charged by Western Electric. It found that they were always
below the competitive prices at which Western Electric sold the
same articles to non-signatories of the license contract and were
also always below the prices at which the same goods could be
purchased on the open market. The court further found that
the profits of Western Electric were not unreasonably large.
Nevertheless, the court disallowed a ten per cent. price increase
which had been put in effect in 1930. The ground for this ac-
tion was the fact that general commodity prices were declining
at the time. This course seems indefensible, if cost to the affili-
ate is to be criteria, for due to declining volume Western Electric
profits were dwindling away so that it is at present operating
at a deficit.142 Both parties appealed from this decision to the
Supreme Court. Unfortunately for the legal student the Su-
preme Court found it unnecessary to pass upon this part of the
lower court's decision, because it found that the depreciation
charge claimed by the company as part of its opearting expenses
was so excessive as compared to actual experience as to invali-
date the whole claim of the company that the commission's rates
were not high enough to yield a fair return.1 4 21 Perhaps the most
through analysis of the problem is in the opinion of the Ohio
Commissions handed down in January 1934.143 This follows the
ruling of the statutory court with reference to the disallowance
of the ten per cent price increase by Western Electric, but makes
a detailed study of the allowability of various classes of expenses
incurred under the license contract. The following table setting
forth the situation with reference to the year 1931 (the last
year for which detailed figures were available) shows the result
of this study:
'2 Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Gilbert (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1933) 3 F. Supp. 595.
'", Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. (1934) 54 S. Ct. 658.
'" Re Ohio Bell Tel. Co. (Ohio 1934) 2 P. U. R. (N. S.) 113.
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Amount Amount
Class of Expense Allowed Disallowed
Operations .................... 164,528
Research ...................... 235,932 102,068
Information (Advertising) ...... 52,365
Personnel ..................... 33,886 5,674
Public Relations ............... 1,483
Treasurer's Department ........ 1,260 58,949
Comptroller's Department ....... 30,505 31,810
Secretary's Department ......... 2,038
General Administration ........ 12,923 12,922
General Service Bureau ........ 9,535 9,535
General Operations ............ 10,071
Legal ......................... 31,437
520,006 286,915
It may be useful to examine the reasons assigned for the vari-
ous sums disallowed. The Commission took a narrow view of
the field of research which might profitably be investigated with
reference to the improvement of the telephone and refused to
allow any expenses in connection with the development of equip-
ment for picture transmission, television, radio transmission,
submarine cables, or vacuum tubes. The advertising and public
relations costs were disallowed on the ground that they were for
the benefit of the system as a whole, while the disallowances in
the other departments were all on the basis that the work per-
formed was for the benefit of the American Company rather
than for the benefit of the local company. The Commission re-
fused to allow any sum as a reserve to protect against liability
for patent infringements, on the ground that there had been no
successful claims against any of the Associated Companies since
1925 and that hence such a reserve was unnecessary. None of
the other commissions and court which have considered the li-
cense contract have been as drastic as this,144 although the Dis-
trict of Columbia Commission has disallowed seventy-five per
cent of the amount spent for research on the ground that it
I" Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. West (D. C. D. Md. 1934) 3 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 341; Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. San Antonio (D. C. D. Tex.
1933) 2 F. Supp. 611 (license contract accepted, but injunction denied be-
cause of failure of proof as Western Electric prices-no examination made
of large unused depreciation reserves and inventory write-downs).
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should be charged to capital rather than to current operations
since it was primarily concerned with the invention of new
equipment. 14
It would not pay to examine in similar detail the treatment
accorded to the management contracts of other holding com-
panies. In many cases they have been disallowed on the ground
that no services were rendered under the contracts, or if any
services were in fact performed, they were solely for the benefit
of the holding company in enabling it to keep a better watch on
its investment. 46 In other instances, sums roughly approximat-
ing the cost of rendering the service have been allowed. 147  In
a few instances, the way has been made easy for the disallow-
ance of management fees by the failure of the holding company
to charge them until a petition for reduction of rates was filed. 2'4 8
'"Re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. (D. C. 1934) 4 P. U. R. (N. S.)
346. An earlier opinion had assigned only forty percent to capital (1932)
P. U. R. 1932 E, 193. Both cases disallow the ten percent price increase on
Western Electric products.
"Re Cities Service Co. (Kan. 1932) P. U. R. 1933 A, 113 (as to pay-
ments to Doherty & Co.); New York State Electric & Gas Co. (N. Y. 1932)
P. U. R. 1932 E, 1; Re Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. (Tenn. 1932)
P. U. R. 1932 E, 386; Texas Border Gas Co. (Tex. 1933) 2 P. U. R. (N. S.
503; Lone Star Gas Co. (Tex. 1933) 4 P. U. R. (N. S.) 541.
"' Re Victor Water Works (Cal. 1932) P. U. R. 1932 D, 29; Re Portland
Water Co. (Conn. 1934) 4 P. U. R. (N. S.) 265; Re Cities Service Co.(Kan. 1932) P. U. R. 1933 A, 113; Re Illinois Power Co. (Ill. 1932) P. U. R.
1932 A, 124; Marlborough v. Marlborough El. Co. (Mass. 1934) 4 P. U. R.(N. S.) 86; Re Western Light & Power Co. (Mo. 1931) P. U. R. 1932 C,
188; Re St. Joseph Water Co. (Mo. 1933) 4 P. U. R. (N. S.) 541; Re Long
Island Water Co. (N. Y. 1934) 4 P. U. R. (N. S.) 541; Re Scranton Spring
Brook Water Service Co. (Pa. 1934) 4 P. U. R. (N. S. 541; Re Columbus
Gas & Fuel Co. (Ohio 1931) P. U. R. 1931 C, 244; Re Western Ohio Public
Service Co. (Ohio 1931) P. U. R. 1931 D, 1; Re Warren Tel. Co. (Ohio
1931) P. U. R. 1932 A, 416; Re Broad River Power Co. (S. C. 1933) P. U. R.
1933 C, 351; Re Kentucky Tennessee Light & Power Co. (Tenn. 1932)
P. U. R. 1932 E, 386; Re Gray's Harbor Ry. & Lt. Co. (Wash. 1931) P. U.
R. 1932 A, 140; Re Oregon-Washington Water Service Co. (1934) 4 P. U. R.(N. S.) 541; Re United Fuel Gas Co. (W. Va. 1931) P. U. R. 1932 B, 61;
City of Wheeling v. Natural Gas Co. (W. Va. 1933) P. U. R. 1933 D, 1;
Re La Crosse Tel. Co. (Wis. 1931) P. U. R. 1931 C, 81; Re Community Tel.
Co. (Wis. 1931) P. U. R. 1931 C, 285; Re Mautson Tel. Co. (Wis. 1933)
P. U. R. 1933 E, 161.
"Donnelly v. Consolidated Water Co. (N. Y. 1933) 3 P. U. R. (N. S.)
173; Re Seattle Gas Co. (Wash. 1934) 3 P. U. R. (N. S.) 433; Re Pan-
handle Lumber Co. (Wash. 1934) 4 P. U. R. (N. S.) 307.
The decision in Logan v. Public Utility Commission (1931) 77 Utah
442,296 Pac. 1006 that the commission could not disallow any contract
charge unless it could show an abuse of discretion simply ignores the ruling
of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. The Utah court
gives no argument to support its views, being content with the statement
they represent well settled law.
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Of great practical importance to the utility is the scope of the
evidence which it must submit. If the required evidence is too
detailed, it will involve great expense in its preparation and even
greater inconvenience to the affiliate bcause of the disorganiza-
tion of records necessary to prepare the required schedules and
exhibits. Perhaps the most extreme example of the requirement
of too great detail is the Montana commission's order which re-
quests detailed invoices for each specific service rendered by each
accountant, engineer, lawyer, or other official of the holding com-
pany which was managing the local company under a manage-
ment contract.149 This would apparently involve the absurdity
of these officials punching a time clock each time they began
another problem, so that they might accurately determine how
long it took them to solve it. Moreover, there would be no
method under this system of invoices to make any allowance for
stand-by service furnished by the officials of the affiliate. The
mere fact that the affiliate has persons capable of answering
the questions of the local company as they arise saves the local
company the expense of maintaining a staff of experts whose
services would be vitally necessary at times but would rarely
be used. 50 In the course of an inquiry into statewide telephone
rates the Wisconsin commission issued a very sweeping series
of demands for information. An idea of the mass of material
required may be given by the fact that one item was a detailed
statement of the manufacturing cost of each kind of article sold
to the Wisconsin Telephone Company by the Western Electric
Company between 1916 and 1930.111 Similar requests were made
by the special master who was hearing evidence with reference
to granting a permanent injunction against the enforcement of
the orders of the Michigan commission requiring a rate reduc-
tion by the Michigan Bell Telephone Company.5 2 On the other
I" City of Polson v. Public Utilities Consolidated Corp. (Mont. P. S. C.
1929) P. U. R. 1929 E, 557.
10 Charges for such service were disallowed in Re Los Angeles Gas &
Electric Co. (Cal. 1930) P. U. R. 1931 A, 132. The commission did not give
this factor any real consideration, perhaps because the local company had
not introduced any evidence as to the reduction that it had been able to
secure in its operating expenses.
... Re Wisconsin Tel. Co. (Wis. 1931) P. U. R. 1931 E, 101.
"'Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission (D. C.
E. D. Mich. 1931) P. U. R. 1931 F, 222. The printed reports do not give
the full terms of the requests, but they were before the Wisconsin Com-
mission when it made its order, and the Wisconsin Commission states that
they were substantially identical with those made by it.
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hand the Ohio commission expressly indicated a desire to be
more moderate in its demands. With reference to the same sit-
uation it only required a statement of the standard shop costs
for each class of items. These were to be stated in lump sums
and the amount of the profit involved stated in general percent.
ages.15' The subsequent history of the Wisconsin case is an ex-
ample of the difficulties which may come from too sweeping
demands. The company submitted the required evidence within
the time allotted, but when the commission handed down an
opinion a year later ordering a temporary reduction in rates, it
confessed that it had not yet had time to study this evidence. 54
Meanwhile the evidence is rapidly becoming outmoded, as rates
are based on present conditions rather than what existed two
or more years ago. In some instances, this difficulty may be
avoided by adopting the findings of the commission of some
neighboring state as to the value of the property of the affiliate
within that state.155 With reference to the item of expense the
commission should always remember that in the long run, it is
the customers who pay for the increased cost of rate hearings,
as these costs may be included in operating expenses, although
they must be amortized over a period of years and cannot all
be charged off in the year incurred.15 6
Recently the commissions have undertaken to reach out and
extend their control so as to forbid the utility to pay out money
to an affiliate without prior approval of the terms of the con-
tract. In large part this power has been conferred by a series
of special statutes.1'57 These statutes vary from state to state.
Most of these statutes contain express definitions of what is
meant by the term affiliate. The original New York act passed
in 1930 made the criteria direct or indirect ownership of more
' Re Ohio Bell Tel. Co. (Ohio 1932) P. U. R. 1932 D, 33.
'"Re Wisconsin Tel. Co. (Wis. 1932) P. U. R. 1932 D, 173.
' Re Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. (Ohio 1932) P. U. R. 1933 A, 337.
'"Mobile Gas Co. v. Paterson (D. C. M. D. Ala. 1923) 293 F. 208;
Streator Acqueduct Co. v. Smith (D. C. S. D. Ill. 1923) 295 F. 385; State
Public Utilities Commission ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Electric
Co. (1920) 291 Ill. 209, 125 N. E. 891.
'"Ala., Laws 1932 (extra sess.) pp. 233-238; R. S. Ind. (Burns) ch. 54
sec. 403; R. S. Kan. (Supp. 1931) ch. 74 sec. 102; N. Y. Public Service Law
see. 110 (3); N. C. Code (Michie 1931) sec. 1037e; Ore. Laws 1933 pp.
815-817; Pa., Laws 1933 pp. 1535-1536; S. C. Laws 1932 p. 1504; Va. (Supp.
1934) see. 3774b-3774k; Wis. (Code 1933) ch. 196 sec. 52; Wash., Laws
1933 p. 549. The South Carolina Statute only applies to electrical utilities.
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than 10% of the voting stock of a utility, membership in a group
or chain of companies connected by such ownership any one or
more of which owner 10% of the voting stock of the utility, hav-
ing one or more officers or directors who are also officers or direc-
tors of the utility, or being in a position either alone or with
others with whom concert of action exists to substantially influ-
ence the utility. This provision was copied in a several other
states."8 The original Wisconsin statute and the present law
of New York reduce the amount of stock to 5% of the voting
stock. This is also the law in Alabama, Oregon, and Washing-
ton. The Virginia and Oregon laws require two or more officers
or directors in common before affiliation exists on this ground
alone. The definitions in some of the statutes are less exact.150
These statutes all provide that the commission shall have access
to the books of the affiliate and can force it to file reports in a
form prescribed by the commission. Of course, if the affiliate
is not doing business within the state so as to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the state, these statutes can have no effect be-
cause of the fundamental principle that the statutes of a state
cannot be given extraterritorial effect.160 However, as we have
seen, this difficulty is more apparent than real, since it would
prove difficult for the affiliate to do much for the utility without
having agents in the state, except in cases in which the affiliate
sold gas or electricity to the utility and made delivery at a point
outside the state. These statutes attempt to give the commis-
sions power to approve or disapprove the contracts made by
the utility with the affiliate. If the commission disapproves,
payment is to be stopped.:"". In some instances approval by the
commission is made a condition precedent to the validity of the
contract.'6 2
Kansas, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.lwThe present North Carolina statute and the first Oregon statute (Laws
1931 ch. 103 sec. 9) made the possession of a "controlling" interest in the
utility decisive. This might be interpreted to require ownership of 51%
of the voting stock. The South Carolina statute requires a finding of
"reasonably substantial affiliation" based on "reasonably substantial con-
trol."
' This is a fundamental principle of Anglo-American Law. Pennoyer v.
Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714.
"'Under the Oregon act the commission can exclude from the accounts
if it finds them unreasonable but can only prohibit payment if it finds them
"imprudent and unwise." The Alabama, North Carolina, and South Caro-
lina statutes are silent on this point.
"' This is true except in Alabama, North Carolina, and South Carolina.
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No cases have yet arisen in which courts have been called
upon to determine the validity of commission action under these
statutes.' 6 It must be confessed that they go much further than
the precedents derived from the power of the commission to dis-
allow operating expenses justify. In these cases it is expressly
stated that the decision of the commission in no way affects the
validity and binding force of the contractual arrangement and
therefore the affiliate is not a proper party to the proceedings
before the commission.' 64 Yet, there are analogies upon which
this control may be supported. Commissions have power to
supervise the issuance of securities by the utilities and have
power to grant or refuse certificates of convenience and neces-
sity authorizing or even compelling the utility to extend its lines
so as to serve other persons. 65 These involve interference in
questions of management which are no more drastic than the
exercise of a power to forbid the making of such contracts.
Statutes of such a nature but with special and limited applica-
tion have existed for a considerable time in some jurisdictions.
Commissions have exercised power under them and this has
never been challenged in court.166 The reason for giving the
commissions such a power has well been expressed by the Ala-
bama commission :167
I In denying a motion to dismiss proceedings seeking injunctive relief
against action by the New York Commission, a judge of the New York
Supreme Court held that the Commission could not forbid payments under
contracts made prior to the passage of the New York statute. New York
State Electric & Gas Corp. v. Maltbie (1933) 264 N. Y. S. 97. The Ohio
Supreme Court has recently sustained the action of the Commission (P. U.
R. 1933 D, 482) in forbidding the payment of unreasonable salaries to per-
sons who are also officers of the holding company and who turn all such
salaries into the holding company's treasury. This decision was put on the
basis that the Ohio statutes give the Commission "general supervision" over
public utilities and that such salaries are in the nature of dividends which
can only be paid out of earning or surplus. Ohio Central Telephone Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission (Ohio 1934) 189 N. E. 650.
Cf. cases cited note 125.
'This power is admitted and yet these orders may cause the companies
great expense.
I Mass. General Laws (1921) ch. 164 sec. 94a (this was passed in 1916);
New Hampshire Public Laws (1926) ch. 242 sec. 20a.
I Re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. (Ala. 1932) P. U. R. 1932 E, 207;
Commissions have exercised this power in the following cases: Re Alabama
Power Co. (Ala 1932) P. U. R. 1932 E, 323; Re Alabama Water Service
Co. (Ala. 1933) 1 P. U. R. (N. S.) 166; Re New York State Electric &
Gas Co. (N. Y. 1932) P. U. R. 1932 E, 1; Re Commonwealth Tel. Co. (Wis.
1932) P. U. R. 1932 D, 299; Re Wisconsin Fuel & Light Co. (Wis. 1933)
P. U. Fortnightly Jan. 19, 1933 p. 134 (all under statutes) ; Public Service
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
We cannot conceive that it will be contended that a Com-
mission is without authority to halt a raid on the treasury
of the operating utility on the plea that it has no right in
law to manage the property. From our point of view, it is
not an assertion of management, but rather an assertion of
reasonable control over practices which the Commission has
a right to prevent and should prevent before the injury has
been done if it is possible for us to arrive there in time.
It may be asked why should the commission, as representative
of the consumers be concerned over a "raid on the treasury of
the operating utility." Directly the consumers will not be af-
fected whether the utility is solvent or insolvent. Their rates
are based upon a fair return on a fair value and it should not
matter to them who gets it. Unfortunately, this argument over-
looks the simple facts that an insolvent utility has no credit
with which to obtain the capital necessary for the continuous
expansion of service demanded from a utility under modern
conditions and that operation of a utility by receivers seems usu-
ally to be thought to result in higher operating expenses than
would ordinarily be incurred. Of course, the harm to other
security holders caused by such a "raid" would be very great,
buti the commissions have normally taken the view that they
have no power to decide controveries which are purely between
the stockholders or creditors of the utility.
The only case which has discussed fully the power of a commis-
sion to exercise such control over contracts made with affiliates,
does not throw much light upon the problem. The New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court recently ruled that the New Hampshire
commission did not possess this power. However, the case is
decided as a matter of statutory construction and is primarily
based upon the peculiar provisions of the New Hampshire sta-
Commission v. Intercommunications Corp. (Ind. 1931) P. U. R. 1932 A, 536.
The North Carolina commission has ordered that copies of all contracts
now in force be filed with it. P. U. R. 1932 A, 536. The Alabama Com-
mission has made a general order that no payments shall be made under
contracts with affiliates until its approval is secured. P. U. R. 1932 E, 206.
The Oregon Commission has exercised this power in a large number of
instances. 2 P. U. R. (N. S.) 384,387. The new Oregon statute gives the
Commission power to reject in advance any expenditure. After such a re-
jection, the sum cannot be charged as an operating expense in any rate
case. If the Commission after hearing makes the affirmative finding that
the expenditure is "improvident and unwise," the Commission may forbid
the payment of the money, no matter to what account the utility intends to
charge it.
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tutes which prevent the commission from taking steps to en-
force its orders without the prior action of the state attorney
general.es8 The court expressly refused to decide the general
question of the commission's power over such contracts.
Certain recent developments have taken place by action of
the holding companies themselves which seem to promise an
easy solution to this problem if they are observed in good faith.
The holding companies dominated by the Morgan interests and
those associated with them in the United Corporation have
adopted the scheme of having all managerial services performed
by a specially chartered company whose stock will be distributed
among the companies according to their gross revenue. Since the
charges for managerial service are to be based upon a percent-
age of the gross revenue, this will ensure that any profits from
such services will be held for the benefit of the local companies
in proportion to the charges upon which these profits were
made. 69 Moreover, the newly formed trade association in the
electric power industry has announced that none wil be accepted
as members of it who do not promise not to make excessive
charges to subsidiaries. This promise is apparently not intended
to be an empty gesture for the governing board is given power,
a staff, and funds to investigate the conduct of any member and
see if it is obeying this and other by-laws of the association.
However, some of the holding companies, including Cities Ser-
vice Company and Associated Gas and Electric Company, have
refused to join this organization. Another hopeful development
is the fact that certain companies have voluntarily submitted
contracts to the commissions for approval before signing them.
Some authorities have taken the view that this whole prob-
lem is too big to be handled effectively by the states and must be
intrusted to some federal agency. Professor Bonbright and the
Federal Power Commission have been the chief advocates of
this doctrine.'" These authorities base their conclusions upon
the difficulty that a state commission may have in obtaining evi-
dence concerning excessive charges made by holding companies
'" State of New Hampshire v. New Hampshire Gas & Electric Co. (N. H.
Sup. Ct. 1932) P. U. R. 1932 E, 369.
"New York Times, November 15, 1932 F 5: 3.
Bonbright, Can We Curb the Holding Company, New Republic, No-
vember 2, 1932.
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and upon the fact that most of the holding companies operate
on a nation-wide scale. The first obstacle is largely fanciful if
the proper legal technic is used. If the commission suspects that
the charges are excessive, it can always institute a proceeding
to determine the reasonableness of the rates charged and force
the local company to prove that the charge is reasonable under
penality of having the charge disallowed as an operating ex-
pense. Under the newer statutes the commission could also
summon the affiliate and the local company to come before it
and show cause why the local company should not be forbidden
to continue payments under the contract. It is significant that
the state commissioners who have been forced to grapple with
this problem consider that they are capable of handling it.171
Entrusting such problems to federal officials would result in a
vast expansion in the number of persons in the federal bureau-
cracy, who would not be as thoroughly acquainted with local con-
ditions as are the state commissioners. It would seem that the
power of the state commissions in this field is ample if they
would only exercise it with vigor and intelligence.
" P. U. Fortnightly, December 22, 1932 P 723.
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